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Abstract 
 
     Since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Northeast Asia and its 
comprising countries have avoided international conflict as well as any regional set 
has done over the past few decades.  The absence of nuclear weapons among Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, in particular, is striking, given their technological and 
scientific capabilities.  Though each of those countries has come close at times to 
developing their own nuclear weapons, one factor or another contributed to the failure 
of those upstart programs.  The United States has played a significant role in all of 
them.  Still, other factors remain. 
     The purpose of this thesis is to determine in detail what caused the lack of a nuclear 
arms race in northeast Asia, beyond the American angle, as far as could be done.  
Existential threats exist to each country involved in the study, theoretically and 
tactically.  Additionally, what causes an outlier like North Korea, which has boldly 
moved forward with nuclear weapons development?  An important work by Scott 
Sagan is utilized in the thesis to assist with developing some far-reaching conclusions, 
with great importance to other parts of the world, beyond northeast Asia.  Other 
literature can assist with those conclusions, as well. 
     The framework of this thesis will be to intermingle a somewhat amended version of 
Sagan’s nuclear proliferation rationalizations with historical analyses to draft some 
region-specific conclusions about why northeast Asia has not had a nuclear arms race.  
Processes going on between countries, within countries, and among countries, 
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militarily, culturally, and economically, play such important roles than none can be 
discarded.  The economic power centered on the capitalist core of northeast Asia can 
show how nuclear weapons acquisition is no longer among the things necessary to 
gain international respect or even security. 
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1. Introduction and Theory 
      
     The East Asia region provides many examples of countries that either possess 
nuclear weapons or the capability to construct weapons of mass destruction.  
However, in recent decades, the Asia-Pacific, initially a very violent and unstable part 
of the world, has calmed down substantially and conventional warfare is not 
imminent.  Nuclear war’s chances seem even more remote in the region, providing a 
contrast to other parts of the continent.  With the exception of North Korea (and 
perhaps not even there), direct warfare with other countries is not among the goals of 
the countries in the region that seek prosperity.  The People’s Republic of China, the 
area’s longest possessor of nuclear weapons, having completed its first successful test 
of the weapon in 1964, is a threat to its neighbors economically, not militarily.  Where 
China may go or not go with its nuclear weapons is a major issue in the Asia-Pacific at 
this point, and also shines as an example of nuclear restraint from a country that had 
been demonized by its adversaries, both capitalist and communist.  Japan, the only 
country to ever suffer from the direct tactical use of atomic weapons on a civilian 
population, has been remarkably insistent up to the present in restraining any 
development of nuclear weapons on the islands.  In that case, it is similar to Israel, 
where the know-how is certainly present, but the governments of the two countries 
obviously perceive an interest in keeping their potential under wraps.  The politics of 
Japan’s public relations concealment of its nuclear capabilities will be an important 
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facet of this paper, because it is politically and economically vital for Japan to hold 
back on making weapons of mass destruction.   
     Somewhat different from the cases of China and Japan, where nuclear weapons are 
very unambiguous subjects, the East Asian upstarts of South Korea and Taiwan have 
had different occasions where nuclear weapons were worked on to an extent, but the 
United States in particular managed to dissuade the two countries from going further 
with their experimentation.  Given the incentives of staying on the good side of the 
Americans in the post-World War II era, it is interesting to explore the issue of the 
nuclear question in the current era, in which American global leadership could be 
ending in a very real way, thanks to the American recession that began in 2007, whose 
effects still linger.  Though a substantial American military presence in South Korea 
remains and the United States still makes billions of American dollars worth of 
weapons sales to the Republic of China, the defense ministries of the two countries 
may find it more necessary to take further control of their own nuclear destinies in the 
coming decades with the receding American sphere of influence that is almost sure to 
come about sooner or later.   
     North Korea, one of the most destitute countries on the planet, is an issue unto 
itself, due to its predictability in behaving unpredictably.  A de facto client state of 
mainland China, North Korea has played a strange game with its benefactors and 
adversaries.  The Six-Party Talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, 
Russia, and China, have arrived at varying results over the years, with North Korea 
promising one thing on occasion and delivering something else.  Its nuclear weapons 
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capability is certainly an issue that has permeated the military and security discourse 
of the region in recent years, with missile tests that have flown directly over the 
Japanese islands, testing the resolve in standing still of the Japanese.  The Korean 
Peninsula is a showcase for being something of the middle of the rope in the 
dangerous game of tug-of-war between the American-led capitalist world and the 
now-Chinese-led de jure Communist world.  Without China’s assistance, the regime of 
Kim Jong-Il in North Korea would almost certainly collapse, so the calculus of the 
Chinese in propping up Kim and his blooming weapons program is an interesting case 
of seeing how far he could take them on their ride toward a regional catastrophe.  Or, 
is no catastrophe imminent at all, and it is just another North Korean game of 
garnering resources from a frightened West?   
     Last but not least, the United States shall play an important role in this project 
because of its leadership in the region, particularly in the case of weapons.  As with 
practically any geopolitical study relating to the last six decades or so, the United 
States might hold the keys to some very enlightening points as to why things are as 
they stand in East Asia.   
     The examples that I have set forth for examination in this project will serve to bring 
us some conclusions about the direction that the nuclear-capable East Asian region is 
heading and the reasons that we have yet to see a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia1.  
The subtleties involved in the region are stark, due to the capability being so widely 
                                                          
1
 Another important player in the region is the Russian Federation, comprising a great deal of the land 
area of the Asian continent, one of the earliest nuclear powers with very little international capital to 
spare since the fall of the Soviet Union.  However, its nuclear weapons remain, and a degree of 
deference has to be paid to it by many in the region for fear of overly insulting a former superpower. 
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viable, but bluster is not common from the governments in the area.  The restraint 
shown by some of the countries in the area that could probably arrive at the answers of 
how to develop these weapons in a relatively short period of time also serve as 
something of an example of how willing a country could be to give up nuclear 
weapons, if a reasonable amount of security could be guaranteed in some other way.   
     In the end, East Asia may serve as something of a model for how countries could 
live in a nuclear reality without there being an imminent danger of a nuclear holocaust 
wiping out a large portion of the territory’s population.  Differently from the late-20th 
century cases of India and Pakistan racing each other to the nuclear brink and 
fortunately stopping just short of their actual use, the historical adversaries of East 
Asia (they have all come to blows with any combination of the countries at some point 
or other within the last few centuries, practically) have not allowed the significant 
presence of nuclear weapons in their realms to present a true danger.  Even with the 
waning power of the United States on the horizon, Japan does not seem to be making 
any great moves to enlarge its defense force or radically alter its constitution to make 
possible offensive war maneuvers.  Many other parts of the world could take a lesson 
from how many East Asian countries are conducting their military and nuclear 
business. 
     This paper shall be split up into several different parts.  A great deal of it will be 
essentially an historical analysis, because the events of the past will serve to show why 
the situation is such, and also to provide insight into where East Asia might be heading 
in terms of its potential nuclear stockpiles from one country or another.  Following 
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upon that section, another major focus of the paper shall be to examine the present 
situation related to diplomatic relations between the de facto and aspiring nuclear 
states of the region.  The violent history of the region for the past several centuries 
reached an abrupt stopping point at the end of the Korean War (not including 
participation in one form or another by some of these states in the Vietnam War and 
its aftermath in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s).  The several conflicts between 
China and Japan, the occupation of Korea and Taiwan by the Japanese, and the 
Korean War seem like distant memories, with the violent paradigm having been 
successfully overcome, for the most part2.  The insidious and potentially threatening 
presence of nuclear weapons and an abundance of nuclear power in East Asia might 
lead one unfamiliar with the case to be wary of the direction the region is headed, as 
far as potential situations of conflict.  However, once one is familiarized with the 
situation of the Asia-Pacific, one might find hope in the human capacity to hold back 
from going too far toward the brink of destruction and utter disaster. 
 
Main Arguments 
     I argue that there are a few major reasons why there has not been an East Asian 
nuclear arms race.  Any one of them would be insufficient by itself.  Northeast Asia 
has been of a central sort of a focus for the United States since the end of World War 
II and the beginning of the Cold War.  Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were all under 
the American sphere of influence during that period, and still are, so American 
                                                          
2
 North Korea remains a notable exception. 
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security guarantees have been vital for those countries to ultimately be nuclear 
weapon-free.  Another reason is that the three countries are very trade-dependent at 
the same time that they have been export-oriented economies since they have entered 
economic modernity.  Therefore, an action as internationally controversial and 
potentially threatening as developing a workable nuclear weapons program would be 
disruptive to those goals of maintaining such vital trade relationships.  Branching out 
from that factor, the acquisition of wealth, both for the individual and for the country 
as a whole, became an objective of the utmost important socially in all three of those 
countries.  The regional obsession with such capitalistic cornerstones created a 
corporatist environment that found nuclear weapons ultimately unnecessary and 
potentially harmful to the needs of good business.  Materialism of that caliber 
arguably eroded away and damaged many of the better traits of the cultures of those 
countries, but it nullified the military dangers of possessing nuclear weapons.  A third 
explanatory factor for the non-nuclear-weaponization of Northeast Asia has been that 
the legal nuclear weapon holder of the region, China, has been terrified the last few 
decades of severe disruptions to the reigning harmony of the area since the end of the 
Sino-Vietnamese War.  Economic reforms that got underway during the tenure of 
Deng Xiaoping gave China new goals of business dominance, participation in the 
global economy, and the cessation of Maoist extremism the likes of which was seen in 
the Great Leap Forward and the Hundred Flowers Campaign.  Along with those 
reforms came a China that appeared ever less likely to embark on overseas military 
campaigns.  Since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War in the late 1970s, China has 
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shown little to no interest in participating in such an activity ever again.  Naturally, 
Japan, South Korea, and especially Taiwan appear more at ease with a China of that 
sort, and feel less threatened, lowering the likelihood of generating a nuclear deterrent 
for the purpose of threatening the world’s most populous country.  Another reason for 
the lack of an East Asian nuclear arms race has been that none of the three countries 
primarily mentioned in these factors have done it, or else it is likely the others would.  
The fifth reason I would like to emphasize here is that of blind luck, pure and simple.  
As will be explained later, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all dabbled in nuclear 
weapons technologies, and South Korea even kept experimentation going into the 
1990s, long after the economy had taken off into the stratosphere.  Such incidents 
show that the economic explanation cannot handle everything that this paper proposes 
to explain. 
     The birth of the nuclear weapon was a harbinger of many things for the late 20th 
century and onward.  The United States, as the first country to successfully test and 
use the forerunner of the modern nuclear weapon, became the world leader in many 
different areas in the post-World War II period, especially in economic and military 
affairs.  The potential ownership of nuclear weapons set off a global arms race that 
became so pervasive that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty became necessary, 
which named the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Great Britain, 
and France, as the sole rightful owners of nuclear weapons.  In the time since, it has 
become obvious that nuclear weapons and at least their potential construction have 
become much more broadly available.   
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     The two combined circumstances of outright nuclear weapons ownership, de facto 
nuclear weapons ownership, and potential nuclear weapons ownership and 
technological know-how is arguably nowhere more widespread regionally than in the 
Asia-Pacific locale.  Therefore, it is an important case to understand in order to 
exemplify the potential obsolescence of nuclear weapons in the modern age.  Rather 
than garnering more respect through the possession of nuclear weapons, it is now 
perhaps an era in which even the ownership of nuclear weapons (and in particular, 
gloating over the potential fact of such ownership, such as with the case of North 
Korea) brings a state ever closer to pariah status, even with countries like Japan that 
had a great deal of international respect to begin with, given their postwar economic 
performance and relative international responsibility and restraint.   
    The contrast between what East Asia used to be (a violent political abyss) and what 
East Asia is now (a relatively calm economic engine) provides an insight into both the 
ways in which nuclear weapons can bring about peace through the nullification of 
potential warfare and also how nuclear weapons no longer can serve any practical or 
even impractical purpose.  Though their methods are very different, the cases of China 
and Japan can play the roles of the established historical powers, South Korea and 
Taiwan are something of the unexpected showcases, and North Korea serves as the 
unfortunate outlier.  Nuclear weapons play a significant part in each case, and are also 
the catalysts for how these countries interact with each other. 
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Review of Other Proliferation Literature   
     In order to find other ways that scholars have gone about searching for 
rationalizations or causal factors for nuclear weapons development, it shall be 
necessary to consult some of the other literature on the subject.  Though my paper is 
fairly reliant on and a bit derivative of Scott Sagan’s 1990s article that will be 
discussed in detail in the next section, the “family” of nuclear proliferation academic 
specialists appears to be relatively small.  Again, a hope for a meaningful contribution 
from this paper is not totally unbelievable, thanks to the relative emptiness within the 
field.  With the explanations of the articles given below, the reader can see other ways 
that specialists in the field have endeavored to locate the meanings and causes of the 
possession of nuclear weapons, starting with their development and construction. 
     The search for such answers is of crucial importance because of the very real 
ability of nuclear weapons to destroy much of the life on Earth, and certainly the 
entirety of humankind if used with enough force and numbers.  As I believe Sagan 
would agree, another useful aspect of the literature review given below is to show 
other methods and answers than those that I have gathered for this paper.  Given the 
multicausality issue that Sagan employs in his 1990s article, many of these answers do 
not exclude any others.  It is very difficult to go outside of the range of case-specific 
issues, but I believe that many shown below do just that. 
     Continuing on with a discussion of some of the proliferation literature that is 
available since the publishing of Sagan’s somewhat qualitative article discussed in the 
next section of this paper, there is an important exploration of the likelihood of nuclear 
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weapons proliferation that uses regression analysis to determine the willingness and 
opportunity of a nation to do such a thing.  The article, “Determinants of Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation,” was done by Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke in 2007, and it 
also comes to some important conclusions from their mathematical computations, just 
as Sagan comes to some important qualitative conclusions.  Their answers that are 
particularly relevant to northeast Asia are these: “nuclear defenders (such as the 
United States per this paper) do discourage a deepening of nuclear proliferation among 
protégés, but there is not much difference between states possessing or lacking nuclear 
defenders in terms of the likelihood of having a nuclear weapons program…(2007: 
186).”  By that assessment, these states have not been atypical in going forward to the 
extent they did, even with the United States guaranteeing their safety.  That much can 
be put to rest.  The following statement can also show the global randomness of 
something like the North Korean nuclear weapons program: “Pariah states are neither 
more likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs nor to possess nuclear weapons 
(2007: 186).”  Therefore, that program can be explained by the particular goals of the 
Kim regime in power there.  The authors also find that there is little to no difference 
between democratic or autocratic regimes in developing a nuclear weapons program, 
and that the NPT only encourages modest adherence to a non-nuclear weapons norm.  
These particular findings do not really fall out of sync with what I have found in the 
particular region under study here. 
     There are more important foundations in proliferation studies that have to do with 
the resoluteness of nuclear powers in dispute situations.  In a logit analysis provided 
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by Michael Horowitz, we find that there is more information available that is relevant 
to the situation of the three major northeast Asian democracies.  Horowitz found that 
“new nuclear states (such as North Korea) appear the most ‘risky’ from the 
perspective of low-level militarized disputes (such as the official continuation of the 
halted Korean War)… (2009: 250),” whereas: “…nuclear defenders (such as the 
United States and China) learn over time to differentiate those challenges worth 
pursuing and those not worth the effort.  The nuclear card cannot be played every 
time…(2009: 250).”  The findings speak to the occasional irrelevance and immaturity 
inherent to various nuclear weapons programs, which can go a long way in explaining 
another reason why some states in northeast Asia have decided to forego the 
obligation of constructing them. 
     Lending some credence to the undertaking that I am trying to accomplish here, 
there are further articles that lament the relative desolation in the literary 
understanding of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Therefore, regional case studies like 
mine might still have some validity.  Alexander Montgomery and Scott Sagan state: 
“…it would be helpful to know…whether uranium enrichment or plutonium 
reprocessing were more commonly abused by covert proliferators, including states that 
started weapons programs and did not complete them (such as South Korea and 
Taiwan)….The articles on the consequences of proliferation also point to the need for 
further research (2009: 322).”  Though South Korea and Taiwan never got the chance 
to abuse such materials per se, they certainly marked a sign of danger that the 
Americans were not willing to risk. 
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     The dependability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is something that is worthy of 
questioning, and the investigation of the honesty of the signatories to that treaty is a 
valid aspect with which to bring into my discussion here.  Matthew Fuhrmann’s 2009 
study is primarily an investigation into whether or not nuclear weapons development 
is a danger that stems from supposedly civilian nuclear projects.  Though some of the 
cases I describe later in this paper had nuclear weapons programs disguised to an 
extent as civilian programs, nuclear power for peaceful use and actual nuclear bomb 
programs remained fairly distinct.  One of the most relevant parts of Fuhrmann’s 
article for this thesis is the good faith efforts of those legal states possessing nuclear 
weapons under the treaty.  Contrary to some that Fuhrmann mentions (2009: 203), the 
case of northeast Asia generally seems to show that, with difficulty, the United States 
has done pretty well in keeping its allies from creating their own nuclear bombs.  
Credit must be given where it is due.  The United States kept an extreme focus on the 
economic development of its client states in northeast Asia, and deweaponizing them 
still remains a priority for the Americans. 
     There is a dialogue in nuclear proliferation literature that is willing to name names 
as to why proliferation occurs and is a danger to the extent that exists.  Marianne 
Hanson names the United States and its vast nuclear arsenal as one of the primary 
political obstacles to halting proliferation globally.  By not working actively and more 
intensively to diminish its supplies, the United States, she argues, is not an effective 
party to non-proliferation discussions (Hanson 2002: 372).  However, the three 
13 
 
countries examined in this paper might be good for the United States’ image in that 
respect, since they are all allies of the Americans. 
     One of the important aspects of the proliferation literature is the number of 
variables explored as far as why states attempt to create their own nuclear weapons.  
Sonali Singh and Christopher Way find some evidence for economic interdependence 
having an effect on foregoing on a nuclear weapons program in some countries (Singh 
et al. 2004: 882).  Indeed, that shall be one of my definitive answers in this paper.  
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, being essentially helpless in a hypothetically 
autarkic system, require a great deal of trade.  Becoming more threatening through the 
development of their own nuclear weapons is too great of a risk for them to go all the 
way.  None of the three countries can afford to have the international community back 
off from the lines of commerce, or they would be destroyed as modern nations.  
Perhaps no answer can go further in explaining the lack of a northeast Asian nuclear 
arms race. 
     The recent era provides a studier of nuclear weapons proliferation with a viewpoint 
advocating the idea that states continue to seek nuclear weapons technology because 
of the political power that it can bring them in the international arena.  Kyle Beardsley 
and Victor Asal write: “When states face nuclear opponents, the cost of all-out, 
unrestrained war is certainly going to be prodigious.  At the same time, the probability 
of such unrestricted war decreases when an actor faces a state with nuclear weapons 
(Bearsdley et al. 2009: 280).”  Therefore, with the countries that have acquired nuclear 
weapons to a significant degree, we see a probable shift further away from the 
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possibility of warfare.  A country like North Korea may be trying to take advantage of 
the likelihood of that theory by making its own nuclear weapons.  The authors also 
find that nuclear weapons provide countries leverage in addition to prestige, and are 
useful in coercing other countries toward their will, so it will be only natural that 
countries will seek the bombs.  This represents a definite supply-side argument for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  I take some issue with it, based on my investigation 
of northeast Asia, but it is pessimistically correct, in principle.  I do agree with them 
that states that hold nuclear weapons can attract greater attention and respect from the 
rest of the world IN SOME RESPECTS, but I am qualitatively unconvinced with the 
extent of that coercive power.  Money appears to me to call many more of the shots.   
     With the exception of Sagan’s 1990s article mentioned in this section and discussed 
in the next, the other papers mentioned are all from within the last decade.  This is 
necessary so as not to become too extraneous, given that the nuclear proliferation 
literature is constantly evolving as global contexts change.  Going too far back 
requires too much adjustment in interpreting them.  The question of nuclear 
proliferators is constantly in flux, and what is remarkable about the three civil rights 
countries in northeast Asia is that they have been willing to take a technological step 
backward in the military sense with their weapons of mass destruction capabilities in 
order that their economy may become more efficient and modernized. 
     As far as generating something of a framework for my own paper here, I believe 
that Sagan’s mid-1990s article will be the most useful.  With that piece, one can see 
how he has become such an acknowledged authority on the subject, and the foresight 
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with which the article is written is impressive enough, not to mention the oft-cited 
quality of it by other proliferation scholars.  As with my own conclusions about 
northeast Asia’s generally nuclear weapon-free qualities, each of Sagan’s nuclear-or-
non-nuclear factors does not work alone.  Rather, they require an understanding of all 
to explain them. 
               
Northeast Asia and Nuclear Proliferation 
     What I am intending to bring to the discussion here is that each case of the major 
states at play in northeast Asia have their own concerns related to developing nuclear 
weapons programs.  Given some of the nuclear proliferation literature available, 
differing rationales are somewhat hit-or-miss in this particular region (no pun 
intended).  As Scott Sagan points out in his mid-1990s article “Why Do States Build 
Nuclear Weapons?:  Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” the conventional wisdom on 
this topic appears to be that of a distinct security threat acting as an excuse to create a 
program when no other alternatives are readily available (1996-97: 54).  Sagan’s 
message there is completely compatible with my argument, since the three major civil 
rights states under the magnifying glass in this paper (Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) have had at least stated alternatives from the United States, their most 
devoted and highly-invested ally (which also has the world’s most powerful military).  
Yet, all three countries have at least dabbled in nuclear weapons projects during the 
Cold War and occasionally afterwards.  Sagan’s article appears to be some of the best 
and most succinct scholarship on the proliferation problem, and is a good way of 
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framing different reasons why states proliferate in such a fashion.  Sagan breaks up the 
motivation for nuclear weapons projects into three parts: 1) a security model, in which 
nuclear weapons are used as distinct deterrents to an enemy’s nuclear attack or the 
threat of war; 2) a domestic politics model, in which nuclear weapons programs are 
used to rally support in a country for the regime; and, 3) a norms model, in which a 
nuclear weapons program is created to gain a nation prestige in comparison to all other 
nations, particularly those that have nuclear weapons. 
     Sagan’s mid-1990s paper on proliferation motivations was an attempt to better 
convey why states would press forward with nuclear weapons programs (or why 
certain states would relent from nuclear weapons production attempts).  The paper has 
withstood the test of time impressively, not least for the reason that the author worked 
so intensively to show particular examples for each of the three proliferation models.  
Much of Sagan’s frustration with previous works on proliferation rationalizations had 
to do with his (justified) assumption that the security model in and of itself was too 
much of a simplistic argument on behalf of realism.  Certainly, Sagan does not discard 
the security model completely in his presumptions of how states could go about 
developing these massively destructive bombs, but he finds it inherently limited, and 
therefore “inadequate (85).”  Sagan mentions: “…an all too common intellectual 
strategy in the literature is to observe a nuclear weapons decision and then work 
backwards, attempting to find the national security threat that ‘must’ have caused the 
decision (63).”  Sagan finds that the balance of power search motif inherent to realist 
thought is all too pervasive in the assumptions of the security model, with the constant 
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“proliferation begets proliferation” ideology.  Though he cites many examples of 
where the security model is apt and applicable, such as the rationale for the Soviet 
Union to acquire nuclear weapons technology in the wake of the American 
detonations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Chinese rationale following the 
threat to Shanghai during the Korean War as well as the dissolution of Sino-Soviet 
relations, he feels that it simply falls short in explaining a great many other cases, and 
therefore the conventional wisdom that the model has come to occupy is in great need 
of revision and addition. 
     Sagan finds that with the security model, nuclear weapons development restraint is 
only caused by the absence of an external security threat, hence the cases of South 
Africa in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and the relinquishments by 
Argentina and Brazil in the wake of their findings of the lack of threats provided by 
one another.  Additionally, the security model finds that the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
only serves as a way for non-nuclear states to hold one another in check.  Given the 
rather cynical view of collective human nature that realism depends upon, the security 
model is really no different, and finds that states are constantly trying to deter one 
another from one grievance or another.  Also, with the end of the Cold War, American 
efforts toward nonproliferation in other countries are going to become ever more 
fruitless, given the constant perceived incentives for states to build nuclear weapons to 
counter each other in an ever more multi-polar world. 
     Again to emphasize, Sagan does not completely discard the security model.  He 
thinks it works in plenty of cases.  He just finds that it does not go far enough to be as 
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universally considered as it seems to be.  Therefore, he finds that there is a need to 
describe the inner workings of governments in their decision-making processes. 
     The domestic politics model indicates that nuclear weapons development is merely 
a means to an end, meaning to say that they are simply tools of politicians and 
bureaucrats working to sway one base or another, or to provide further funding for a 
certain department.  Sagan lays out the framework a bit in this excerpt: 
“…bureaucratic actors are not seen as passive recipients of top-down political 
decisions; instead, they create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition by 
encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats, promoting supportive politicians, 
and actively lobbying for increased defense spending (64).”  The public also plays a 
major role in the domestic politics model, given that in many cases politicians are 
answerable to a kind of general will of the people.  In essence, this model is all about 
what is going on inside of a country, not outside of it. 
     Sagan highlights the example of the Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1974 
as a case of the domestic politics model being fairly convincing.  The defeat of India 
in the 1962 Sino-Indian War would have been assessed by the security model as a 
reasonable rationale for developing the bomb.  However, India backed down at that 
time, in spite of probable capability, and ultimately did not try to build the bomb after 
the successful 1964 Chinese nuclear test, nor did India endeavor to rally any nuclear 
support from either part of the bipolar world of the time, in the domestic interests of 
remaining without alignment.  The real maneuvers came with the lobbying of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi in the early 1970s.  Within the evidence, Sagan finds that 
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domestic factors were far more integral to the ultimate decision than international 
ones.  He describes how defense and foreign affairs officials, military services, the 
Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minister were not intensively consulted on what 
such a nuclear test would mean for their work.  Rather, the test was simultaneous with 
a definite down period for the Gandhi administration.  Political fracturing and 
infighting, a bad recession, and major riots throughout the country all weighed heavily 
on the mind of the prime minister.  Therefore, Sagan rightfully finds it fairly 
persuasive that these factors played a role in her decision to green-light the explosion.  
The domestic political incentives, particularly in terms of public opinion, allowed her 
gamble to pay off. 
     To add to the evidence for the domestic politics model in general, Sagan uses the 
example of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program, which was voluntarily given up 
by the government of F.W. de Klerk, just prior to the dissolution of the Apartheid 
system.  The nuclear program there had been built up arguably to satisfy the interests 
of the massive South African mining industry, which was looking to gain international 
clout for its expertise and technical accomplishments.  According to Sagan’s 
reasonable logic, it seems that de Klerk, upon his 1989 election, chose to dismantle the 
nuclear weapons that South Africa had in order to prevent the oncoming African 
National Congress (ANC) from possessing nuclear weapons.  This is undoubtedly to 
be considered a domestic political concern. 
     The domestic politics model implies that economic costs or benefits of forging 
ahead with nuclear weapons program weigh heavily on the minds of governmental 
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actors in certain countries.  The fear of a backlash, be it from corporate or mass public 
sources, can shift the opinion of policymakers in one direction or another.  Potential 
adherence to the NPT can also push domestic actors toward certain measures.  The 
domestic politics model pushes the security model to a secondary position, and Sagan 
appears to find much to like about the domestic model. 
     Finally, the norms model that Sagan employs focuses on the importance of global 
understanding and agreement on certain nuclear weapons policies.  Sagan writes: “The 
sociologists’ arguments (related to normative symbolism) highlight the possibility that 
nuclear weapons programs serve symbolic functions reflecting leaders’ perceptions of 
appropriate and modern behavior (75).”  Sagan highlights the NPT as a way that world 
leaders have expressed their opinions in terms of the emerging norm that the NPT 
comprises.  He also goes further back in history, using the ultimate global abolition of 
legalized slavery as an example of how a norm came into being. 
     The examples of France and Ukraine are paired against one another to show how 
times can change, leaving different norms in place to send different countries on 
divergent paths.  In the few decades following World War II, the French leadership 
saw that global norms demanded that France had to develop the bomb in order to 
maintain international respect (particularly after its temporary land conquest by Nazi 
Germany), given that others of the great powers had developed nuclear weapons.  This 
example represents something of an opposing understanding to what the East Asian 
states under examination in this paper have come to agree upon.  However, France did 
develop the bomb successfully, and became a legal holder of them under the NPT.   
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     In Ukraine, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a large stockpile of 
nuclear bombs left over from the old regime.  Rather than keep them, which would 
have been its prerogative to an extent, the parliament there decided to give them up.  
By that time, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, nonproliferation had come into being 
as something of a global obsession and a generally recognized norm.  By that time, the 
NPT was a widely accepted structure that Ukraine, as a relatively new member of the 
burgeoning community of nations, was obligated to follow.  Like South Africa from 
another situation, it still stands as a fairly rare example of a country simply giving up 
the bomb. 
     Sagan’s paper is all about multicausality.  He does not discredit in particular any of 
the three models that he lays out, even the security model.  His framework shows that 
there are constantly different explanations of nuclear weapons proliferation, or lack 
thereof.  The relative desolation within existing political science literature to stretch 
beyond the security model is also a reason for why he embarked on such a journey.  
The norms model in particular seems clearly to be one that he wished to highlight in 
particular, to be sure. 
     Sagan’s framework given in his paper will be an integral aspect of the theoretical 
portions of this paper, given that they have applications to the countries under study 
here.  However, given that the three main countries studied for this paper have not 
developed nuclear weapons, one could say that the rationalizations given by Sagan in 
each of the three models requires a certain degree of flipping.  Indeed, what I am 
endeavoring to do here, in part, is to take this project in the direction of expanding 
22 
 
what Sagan says, which is, in effect, that there is more work to be done to discern why 
states can avoid nuclear developments, and how norms in particular are somewhat 
fluid.  As will be shown later, a non-nuclear prestige norm has apparently emerged in 
northeast Asia, enabling Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to latch onto that prestige in 
order to enhance their international status and good name, whereas an outlier like 
North Korea has only hurt itself in terms of international politics by developing 
nuclear weapons capabilities.   
     International relations theory is crucial to this paper, and how it fits in with Sagan’s 
three models that are somewhat modified here.  The security model fits in quite nicely 
with realism, as has been already mentioned.  As Kenneth Waltz states, “Each state 
arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but 
its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions 
with them (1979: 65).”  The security model is inherently related to the assumption that 
the balance of power and the maintenance of security for each state affect the 
development of nuclear weapons.  Undoubtedly, at times, it is true, and Sagan 
concedes this. 
     The domestic politics model set forth by Sagan hearkens toward many of the 
principles of liberalist international relations theory.  The case of Japan, in particular, 
which will be discussed shortly, shows how domestic actors, in that case highlighting 
the general public, can have a major stake in maintaining a good reputation, especially 
given the importance to the country of a healthy financial structure.  As we will see, 
the cooperation among most of the northeast Asian countries along financial lines has 
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had a direct effect on nuclear weapons policy.  Robert Keohane writes: “As long as a 
continuing series of issues is expected to arise in the future, and as long as actors 
monitor each other’s behavior and discount the values of agreements on the basis of 
past compliance, having a good reputation is valuable even to the egoist whose role in 
collective activity is so small that she would bear few of the costs of her own 
malefactions (1984: 105).”  A good reputation is of critical importance to Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, since they are all terribly poor in terms of natural resources.  
However, their export-oriented economies have flourished, and a good reputation is 
everything to them at this point.  International cooperation on their part, particularly 
with the rising power of China, a former enemy of all of them, is of the utmost 
importance.  In many cases in northeast Asia, the domestic politics factor bleeds into 
the norms factor, in which the three sets of general publics of the countries have the 
common understanding of remaining nuclear weapon-free.  Given the democratic 
leanings, particularly of late, of all three of them, nuclear weapons would certainly be 
more on the table than they are if the general publics were demanding them.  They 
most definitively are not. 
     The norms model inevitably leads to a comparison with constructivism in 
international relations theory.  Mutual understandings based on historical 
developments as well as popularized ideas comprise a great deal of what Sagan is 
getting at with his norms model.  John Gerard Ruggie writes: “There can be no 
mutually comprehensible conduct of international relations, constructivists hold, 
without mutually recognized constitutive rules resting on collective intentionality 
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(1998: 879).”  This also ties in with the idea of a non-nuclear prestige in northeast 
Asia.  It is a shared understanding among most of the countries mentioned in this 
paper.  Norms rely on being followed by many actors, if not most, so therefore the 
constructivist notion that a great deal of international behavior rests on mutual 
understandings among nations perfectly fits. 
     The research design for this paper will focus on matching up intensive historical 
analyses with my applications of the developments within that structure to my flipping 
maneuver of Sagan’s three models.  Along with that, my five points given in my 
reasoning above for how the northeast Asian democracies have remained nuclear 
weapon-free over the long-term can be matched up with the flipped Sagan models to 
truly find a concrete understanding of how this tremendous accomplishment has been 
done.  Additionally, the contribution of this paper is to not only connect the flipped 
Sagan models to international relations theories like the ones mentioned above, but 
also to come to some real-world conclusions about how such a powerful region as this 
one in northeast Asia can relent from seeking even greater potential power.  The 
findings here are especially crucial because of the number of people that live in the 
region, who would be within range of many potentially-built tactical devices like the 
ones that we can hope will forever be avoided, namely the nuclear weapons that will 
be under heavy discussion throughout this paper. 
     By using reversed versions of Sagan’s three nuclear proliferation models (the 
reversed versions themselves being among the factors that Sagan concedes within his 
very framework in the article) in northeast Asia specifically, important answers can be 
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located as to how nuclear weapons and their sheer potential ferocity, terrifying in 
scope, has essentially frightened an entire region into a sustained period of relatively 
unparalleled peace, particularly for that part of the world.  It can be hoped that such a 
lesson can be applied to other parts of the world that remain far more volatile.  
However, northeast Asia’s general natural resource poverty remains something of an 
ever-present outlying factor throughout this paper.  For example, at this point, the 
Middle East could not empathize very well with the northeast Asian example because 
of the still resilient oil reserves that are found in that region.  Northeast Asia never had 
such a luxury, or such a curse, however one wishes to frame the situation. 
     A further point on Sagan’s paper and its role in this paper is this: if one is going to 
borrow, one might as well borrow from the best.  Though the article is about 13 years 
old, I believe that one would be hard-pressed to find a better set-up in order to prompt 
one to find some concrete answers to nuclear proliferation or the lack thereof.  It was 
an effort of imagination, which was my intention with this paper, as well.  By 
reversing the framework that he employs to show how, theoretically, all three 
northeast Asian democracies failed to gain nuclear weapons (or succeeded in avoiding 
them), the historical analyses make more sense and can be understood in a more 
holistic way.  As will be shown, it was often a close call, but, with nuclear weapons, 
answers such as the ones found in this project are better when they are barely right 
than when they are terribly wrong.   
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Sagan’s Applications to Northeast Asia      
     The most compelling of these in regard to northeast Asia are the security model 
mixed with the domestic politics model (the latter of which is working in reverse in 
these cases).  The reasons that these current civil rights states were earlier motivated to 
begin work on nuclear weapons are almost certainly linked to a lack of faith in the 
American nuclear commitment to them.  As will be discussed briefly in the Japan 
section of this paper, Charles de Gaulle, longtime president of France following World 
War II, is mentioned in Sagan’s article as disbelieving America’s claim to protect 
France from a Soviet missile attack, particularly after the Russians developed a 
second-strike capability (Sagan 1996-97: 76).  Just as de Gaulle questioned an 
American response to a Soviet nuclear attack on Paris, so the Japanese, South 
Koreans, and Taiwanese, might dread similar circumstances regarding Tokyo, Seoul, 
and Taipei, respectively.  Though the Americans have ultimately been successful in 
persuading these East Asian democracies that American pressure will contribute to 
their lasting security from the existential threats that face them from overseas, long-
term implications are difficult to foresee, given that the United States is undoubtedly 
slipping from global hegemony in terms of military prowess, and North Korea now 
has nuclear weapons, which presents an increase to the threat level to all three 
countries discussed, but particularly to Japan, longtime rival of the Communist state.  
Up to the present, however, the United States has secured the region, with the political 
cooperation of its three client states that are intensively studied in this paper.  
Therefore, the security alternative that would be implied in such realist thinking has 
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been supplied by the policies of the United States, freeing the northeast Asian 
countries under scrutiny from developing their own nuclear weapons.  There is not an 
absence of a threat to any of the three countries, certainly, but the United States has 
effectively canceled it out up to this point.  The future is another issue. 
     The intermingling of the domestic politics model of Sagan’s argument works in the 
reverse way in East Asia by way of the financial sector.  Sagan mentions the fact that 
Argentina did not develop a nuclear weapons program following its defeat to the 
British in the Falklands War in 1982 (1996-97: 71).  Normally, one might think that 
the domestic model would portend that pressure from the public would increase the 
likelihood of the government prioritizing such a program.  On the contrary, the fact 
that following the conflict the country was liberalized followed a pattern of public 
sentiment against such weapons, decreasing the likelihood greatly.  Similarities to that 
reversal exist in these countries, since they have all grown more left-wing since 
nuclear weapons were really on the table.  The democratization of South Korea and 
Taiwan in particular have been beneficial in keeping nuclear weapons off the table for 
the time being.  Additionally, Sagan mentions another trait that is important in 
understanding why the Northeast Asian states have remained relatively nuclear 
weapon-free, using Argentina as an example from which they can relate: “…(the 
emergence of governments) supported by coalitions of actors – such as banks, export-
oriented firms, and state monetary agencies – who value unimpeded access to 
international markets and oppose economically unproductive defense and energy 
enterprises (1996-97: 71).”  With the emergence of Northeast Asia, and with the group 
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of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular, as one of the cores of global 
commerce and finance, the simultaneity of that occurrence together with the 
abandonment of nuclear weapons development (for the most part) is difficult to 
dismiss.  
     The domestic model that Sagan puts forth is also in need of some revision in Asia, 
given that there are very few parallels between the South African case (given the 
relative lack of interracial disputes domestically in these societies) or the Indian case, 
since the nuclear weapons issue has been summarily rejected.  Therefore, this paper 
has something to add, in that respect.  
    Sagan’s norms model, though useful in global terms, does not have a great deal of 
relevance in northeast Asia without being flipped (like Ukraine, but in a less 
outspoken and publicized way), since the at least spoken norm in the region has been 
related to a lack of nuclear weapons, or at least the claim against it.  The covertness of 
development or discussion of that development that has been seen in the region speaks 
to how unacceptable it is in governmental discourse in Asia (with the exception of 
China, since they have been granted the legal right to possess the bombs).  However, 
one could see Sagan’s viewpoint as far as the norms model as accurate as to why these 
three particular northeast Asian countries have not developed the bomb ultimately.  
This is because it seems that a different norm has taken over in east Asia, where China 
is seen as the sole rightful owner of the weapons.  North Korea has violated those 
norms with its recent nuclear weapons developments.  Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan are adhering to them, with American pressure. 
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2. The Case of Japan      
     Japan is a crucial case for understanding the context of nuclear weapons armaments 
in the East Asia region due to its large population and economic size and due to its 
relatively recent military history.  Japan’s difficult relations with its neighbors 
continue to present the island country with a variety of diplomatic problems, 
especially when it comes to the issue of nuclear arms.  As one of the primary Axis 
powers from World War II, the conflict that particularly encouraged the development 
of weapons of mass destruction, and as the only national victim in military history of 
an atomic attack, Japan naturally has a tenuous relationship with the issue of nuclear 
weapons.   
     In order for it to become clear how the issue of Japanese nuclear technology would 
attract attention from Japan’s East Asian neighbors, it shall be necessary to explain 
briefly many of the historical instances where relations among Japan and its neighbors 
went astray.  During its imperial period following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan 
embarked on its first major war against China in the first Sino-Japanese War, which 
began in1895.  Japan’s victory in that war increased its confidence in its ability to be 
an imperial power to rival those of Western Europe and North America.   
     In 1910, Japan annexed the Korean Peninsula, which lasted until 1945 at the end of 
World War II.  Japan’s brutal occupation of Korea continues to be a diplomatic burden 
between even Japan and South Korea, which would otherwise probably be a natural 
alliance, given the apparent goals and general ideologies of the two nations.  Japan 
even enforced conscription on many Koreans during World War II, and took 
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advantage of Korean “comfort women” during the war for its fighting men.  The 
eventual victory of the United States and the Soviet Union over Japan at the end of 
World War II finally freed the Koreans of Japanese domination of their territory. 
    The Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, basically beginning World War II in 
the process.  Fighting on Chinese territory, Japan exacted a tremendous amount of 
destruction before finally being totally driven off the Asian mainland in 1945 with the 
combination of Chinese and Soviet forces on the ground and American forces from the 
east.  This war had a much different ending for China than the first major conflict with 
Japan, but lingering hatred still causes there to be diplomatic issues between the two 
countries at the same time that there is a great deal of economic interdependence.  
Taiwan, now a de facto independent state from mainland China (due to the Republic 
of China government holed out on the island), was also a Japanese colony during 
much of the first half of the 20th century, until the end of World War II. 
     Japan finally lost all of its conquered territories at the end of World War II, after 
the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, which followed relentless and brutal American firebombing campaigns on 
all of its major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe.  Having been directly 
responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people in Asia, it is easy to see how 
Japan still encounters problems in its relations with other nations in Asia, thanks to its 
military exploits following its reconsolidation as a single state.  Simultaneously, as the 
only victim of a nuclear attack, Japan now regularly faces issues of redefining how it 
views nuclear weapons and nuclear power in general.  Technologically, Japan 
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maintains the capability to produce nuclear weapons if it became a national priority.  
The global community would potentially have many different interpretations of the 
meaning of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, if it was to be discussed out in the 
open. 
 
Japanese Nuclear Explorations 
     Even during the early days of the Cold War, Japanese authorities began to quietly 
explore the country’s nuclear weapons options.  Though the United States had carried 
out a relatively friendly occupation of the country following their adversarial 
relationship during World War II, Japan did not want to solely rely on the United 
States forever for its security.  Particularly in light of its recent conflicts with China, 
Japan’s eye was locked almost squarely on its newly-Communist regional rival 
following the fall of the Kuomintang government on the mainland in 1949.  Michael J. 
Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa write: “Ironically, it was not only the Chinese nuclear 
test that prompted thinking about nuclear weapons in Japan but also the beginning of 
negotiations to establish the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Japanese officials 
feared would lock Japan into second tier status in the international system…(Green et 
al. 2008: 349).”  However, given the experience at the end of World War II, the 
Japanese public remains resiliently anti-nuclear in their opinions.  Green and 
Furukawa also write: “Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea’s (2006) 
nuclear test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire 
nuclear weapons…(Green et al. 2008: 347).”  However, one may be left to wonder 
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how that public opinion would shift if China were not such a close economic partner 
and if the United States were not the ever-present ally looking over their shoulder.   
     One of the problems the Japanese are facing is the evolving security relationship in 
the East Asia region.  Though the Korean War has been essentially over since 1953, 
the North Korean regime cannot seem to rid itself of the memory of Japanese 
atrocities committed in their territory during the occupation of the pre-World War II 
age.  The North Korean missile tests of the 1990s and 2000s have strained the 
Japanese ability to rely on security provided by the Americans.  Therefore, difficult 
choices may have to be made in the future to redefine the Japanese military’s overall 
role. 
     Similarly to the absolute renunciation of Germany toward all aspects of the Nazi 
regime in that country, the Japanese continue to rebuke offensive military operations, 
perhaps to rid themselves of a reputation that is a long time in dying.  However, given 
the potentially aggressive nature of the East Asian region and its corresponding parts, 
it is difficult to imagine that that would be possible without the American security 
umbrella.  The American security umbrella is also an arrangement that has benefited 
the United States’ economic goals in East Asia, essentially oriented to making Japan 
the anti-communist figurehead of a modern Asia oriented toward American-style 
capitalism.  The American security umbrella enabled Japan to rid itself of its wartime 
past in part because Japan was no longer responsible for its own security.  The 
following is an excerpt that draws a connection between Japan and Germany along the 
lines of a lack of nuclear weapons development in spite of economies that were more 
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than capable of producing them: “…Germany, like its erstwhile Axis ally Japan, has 
become powerful because of its economic might rather than its military might, and its 
renunciation of nuclear weapons may even have reinforced its prestige (Mueller 2010: 
107).”  It seems apparent that that outcome was only possible via a United States that 
was so desperate and determined to thwart the expansion of influence of the Soviet 
Union that it was willing to prevent anyone from taking revenge on the country that 
had fought with and killed so many.  Over the next few decades after the end of World 
War II, Japan’s eventual economic inferiors of the United Kingdom, France, and 
communist China went on to produce their own nuclear weapons.  Japan was in the 
hands of the United States military at a time when no one else could imagine 
adequately rivaling that particular fighting force. 
     The last decade or two have been strange times for the leadership and overall 
population of Japan.  I would argue that this is due to it being an odd generational 
period, given that there have still been plenty of people in Japan and around the world 
that are old enough to remember living through World War II to an extent, but the 
percentage of that GI generation still in power in office has been dwindling all the 
time.  It appears that, stemming from that, many scholars of the topic are arguing in 
favor of the idea that Japan is moving ever further toward its nationalistic past.  One 
could reason from that, if it were true, that nuclear weapons would be relatively near 
on the horizon for Japan.  Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara speak to some of 
these sentiments.  They write: “…in May 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo 
Fukuda hinted to reporters that, if shifts in the international situation and public 
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opinion occur, Japan could reconsider its ban on nuclear weapons….this more 
threatening view seems to suggest that there is ample reason to bemoan the stubborn 
ignorance with which U.S. policy makers and media continue to deny obvious 
historical parallels between contemporary Japan and Japan of the 1930s (Katzenstein 
et al. 2004: 169).”  If the remarkably good behavior of postwar Japan has been 
essentially a ruse on the international community, American global influence has not 
dwindled to the point where the Japanese would not have to wait for many more years 
before making their move.  Also, China is not what it was during World War II and 
before.  Sheila Smith cites a statement by Ichiro Ozawa from 2002 discussing Japan’s 
intentions toward an increasingly powerful China: “(Ozawa) noted that it would be 
easy for Japan to produce nuclear weapons, and suggested that there was enough 
plutonium at Japan’s nuclear plants to generate thousands of nuclear warheads (Smith 
2003: 4).”  At the time, Ozawa was discussing how the Japanese people would react to 
a more assertive and potentially aggressive China, so, obviously, many found it 
unsettling when he made this statement.   
    On the other hand, North Korea, perpetually starved for attention, may be the single 
biggest motivator for Japan to think about amplifying its security capabilities.  Though 
the Japanese Defense Forces are superior to the North Korean military, weapons of 
mass destruction remain among the biggest bargaining chips in existence.  Reactions 
of Japan’s current allies to any further developments along the lines of nuclear 
weapons development would be an important indicator of the potential intentions of 
the Japanese in gaining such materiel.  South Korea is particularly important for the 
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study of modern Japanese diplomacy, due to the countries’ similar political 
methodologies paired with their antagonistic histories toward one another. 
 
Loyalty to the Non-Nuclear Oath 
     A problem that Japan has encountered in its military alliance with the United States 
has been the potential hypocrisy to be noted stemming from Japan’s Non-Nuclear 
Principles.  Though Japan has apparently not produced or possessed any nuclear 
weapons, the idea that it has not allowed nuclear weapons onto its islands is something 
of a farce.  Given its military bases throughout Japan and their strategic importance for 
the United States, the Americans have certainly carried nuclear weapons into Japan.  
Given the remarkably close relationship between the United States and Japan, one 
might even ambiguously think of Japan as a de facto nuclear weapons state since it has 
militarily been so synonymous with the United States, in much the same way that 
NATO has been so reliant on the United States to protect Western Europe, particularly 
during the Cold War.  For matters of rhetoric, the Japanese should most likely be 
concerned with how the Non-Nuclear Principles are viewed internationally, since they 
form so much of the crux of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons sentiments. 
     From the Indian perspective, there was some backlash toward Japan given Japan’s 
sanctions placed on India (as well as Pakistan) after the South Asian country went 
nuclear in the late 1990s.  Purnendra Jain addresses the issue of Japan’s perceived 
anti-nuclear hypocrisy in his article entitled “India’s Calculus of Japan’s Foreign 
Policy in Asia:”  “Japanese leaders claim that Japan is firmly committed to nuclear 
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non-proliferation, but Japan itself finds shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  Japan 
also blatantly disregards its non-nuclear principles by allowing U.S. ships with nuclear 
facilities to visit Japanese ports (Jain 2002: 227).”  Jain addresses Japan fairly harshly 
in that segment, and it is perhaps understandable. Still, Japan’s nuclear dilemma is 
particularly acute, given the surroundings.  Does Japan not require that nuclear threat 
or shield from the United States for the sake of deterrence?  Are China and North 
Korea not actual threats?  It is difficult to find alternatives to what Japan has allowed.  
As well, the United States may have a different viewpoint than Japan if Japan were to 
request the cessation of the movement of those nuclear facilities within its territorial 
waters or at its ports.   
     Japan has had a history of its own questions related to the American commitment to 
its protection (or at least its retaliation) from nuclear attacks.  Nobumasa Akiyama 
cites some important developments during the Cold War that shook some Japanese on 
the issue of how far the American retaliatory shield could potentially extend 
circumstantially.  Akiyama writes: “France chose to leave NATO as it questioned the 
credibility of the nuclear umbrella.  If the Soviet Union attacked Paris with nuclear 
weapons, France questioned whether the United States would sacrifice New York for 
Paris, which had already been destroyed.  Would the United States risk New York and 
Washington DC for an already destroyed Tokyo (Akiyama 2003: 86)?”  Given the 
example of France, Japan was left in something of a quandary, not that it had as much 
international political leeway as France to do such a thing, at least at the time.  France 
had, after all, not been one of the Axis aggressors of World War II, so the world had 
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less to fear in the 1960s from a more militarily autonomous France than it might have 
had from a Japan that did the same thing.  Therefore, in my assessment, that would not 
have been politically feasible for Japan to do, though France’s methodology is also 
something I find understandable.  The steadfastness of America’s commitment to Paris 
might have appeared somewhat dubious.  However, in the article by Green and 
Furukawa, it is mentioned that France played a large role as a model for a Japanese 
plan of action as far as its alliance with the United States.  They write: “(Prime 
Minister Hayako) Ikeda was…encouraged to think about nuclear weapons by French 
President Charles de Gaulle, who criticized Japan’s dependence on the United 
States…,and in subsequent discussions with the German chancellor, who was 
contemplating his nation’s options…(Green et al. 2008: 349).”  Ever the ally at arm’s 
length (perhaps with good reason, from their perspective), France was not the greatest 
advocate for the United States.  Still, de Gaulle was not successful in persuading the 
Japanese to create their own nuclear program, though he did have a point.  With 
changes occurring in China and the Koreas, Japan became something of a foreign 
policy tool for the United States, and this continues today.  Germany, too, relented in 
any pursuit of nuclear arms, in spite of its technological capability and know-how.   
     The changing and growing threats of the current century will undoubtedly continue 
to shape the context of whatever new international environment in which Japan found 
itself later.  Therefore, it may be a petty exercise to speculate too much on what could 
happen as far as Japan is concerned if such and such a thing were to hypothetically 
occur.  One thing that can certainly be given a lot of focus and definite interest is what 
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the reaction would be if Japan were to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Andrew 
Oros writes: “…it is not clear even to Japanese (or foreign) military strategists, and 
certainly not to Japanese voters, how a nuclear weapons Japan will create a safer 
environment in the future.  As one noted columnist has written: ‘The shock waves of a 
Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms would ripple out to the rest of Asia and would be 
so strong that Japanese efforts to exert diplomatic influence would be set back a half 
century (Oros 2003: 60).’”  Perhaps from that statement, which is fairly compelling, 
we can glean the notion that was echoed earlier, which is that Japan’s postwar prestige 
that was meticulously developed by government and business leaders was built on a 
foundation of newfound de facto pacifism.  By adopting a totally defense-only military 
stance (bringing briefcases to foreign settings rather than machine guns), Japan 
practically managed to match Germany in regaining the trust of the global community 
after incidents that might have seemed to nullify any potential for that at an earlier 
time.  Japan’s occasional political silence on the issue of wartime atrocities were the 
only things that kept Japan from Germany’s status of apparent near-total forgiveness 
by the international community following World War II. 
     For circumstances to shift enough to where Japan started to actively seek the 
possibility of its own possession of nuclear weapons, it might be that that columnist is 
correct in that Japan may as well not bother.  It might be better for Japan to risk 
becoming a martyr state rather than to certainly endeavor to become a pariah nation, 
violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so boldly that it claims to currently 
uphold and respect.  The enduring nature of the global memory of World War II is 
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potent.  Fighting on the losing side of that conflict that ended 65 years ago has left 
Japan with very few reasonable options diplomatically when it comes to nuclear-based 
weaponry.   
     The Japanese public remains the greatest obstacle to the development of nuclear 
weapons by the state.  The realist strategy indicated by the Japanese government of the 
postwar era (Shuja 2006: 2) highlights how Japan is governed only by what is deemed 
by those in power to be best for Japan.  Also, given that Japan is a relatively old 
democracy, the public does have a significant effect on the direction taken by its 
government (a lesson learned perhaps painfully by the long-ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party during last year’s elections).  The long-standing presence of the United States 
military in Japan cannot be explained away by sheer inertia.  Not only has the United 
States had plenty to gain in maintaining its global influence by stationing itself in a 
far-off land like Japan, but the Japanese have had something to gain, as well, by 
allowing the United States to remain there while enduring relatively little fuss.  Sharif 
Shuja mentions that relationship.  He writes: “In the absence of a domestic political 
consensus for a new assertive foreign policy, and in the face of the reluctance of 
Japan’s neighbors to accept a major military power as well as a more active 
independent Japanese security role, the alliance with the United States will very likely 
remain the best security strategy for Japan, provided that the US continues its 
engagement in Asia (Shuja 2006: 30).”  The modern Japan can be seen, therefore, as 
the result of global peer pressure.  In its efforts to cast off the stigma produced by its 
World War II errors, Japan has worked very carefully for decades to seem like a 
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responsible global citizen, and, for the most part, it has worked.  Many of Japan’s 
diplomatic problems in the modern era are the results of what Japan did during its 
imperial period.  The final sentence in the above quotation also opens the door to 
thinking about what Japan might have to do when the very real consequence of 
American actions of late, such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, force the United 
States to rely less on its armaments in Japan.  The United States may then face the 
time when Japan will have to be nearly solely responsible for its own security.  The 
USS Japan may not be an option for the United States for too much longer.  That is not 
due to anything the Japanese have done or will do, but to the economic and military 
mismanagement of those in power in the United States. 
 
Japan’s Probable Answer 
     A further point emphasizes that which has already been stated thus far in this paper, 
which is that Japan remains an unlikely nuclear power.  That further point is this: 
Japan, as a country that is not wealthy in terms of natural resources, has become a 
developed, industrialized nation thanks in part to its postwar international pacifism (at 
least as far as the behaviors of its own troops).  Its delicate diplomacy, paired with 
remarkable and uncommon social emphases on education and human capital, have 
made Japan what it is today.  If Japan were to develop nuclear weapons of its own, all 
of that would be threatened.  The solid reputation that Japan still maintains would be 
in serious jeopardy.  The resource threat that Japan would face is outlined in an article 
by Matake Kamiya: “The country imports nearly 80 percent of its total energy 
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requirements and almost 100 percent of its petroleum requirements.  In fiscal 2000, 
Japan was self-sufficient for only 40 percent of its calories and 28 percent of its cereal 
grains.  As an island nation, Japan depends on sea-lanes for imports and exports 
(Kamiya 2002: 67).”  The development of Japan’s own nuclear weapons would, 
therefore, require an excuse from the Japanese that they had exhausted all other 
options.  Given the international hostility that would arise against any country that 
created a situation where the global community would be in agreement that Japan 
would be justified in such a maneuver would also render such a move by the Japanese 
useless, given that it would be the responsibility of the rest of the world to condemn 
the wrongdoer.   
     The Japanese that launched the Asian and Pacific theaters of World War II failed in 
their mission to make Japan the most feared country in the world, but the Japan that 
emerged in the decades after the war’s conclusion succeeded mightily in making Japan 
one of the world’s most respected nations, thanks in part to its accrued economic 
power in spite of its lack of any globally-meaningful natural resources.  Kamiya 
outlines three other important reasons that he believes Japan will never be interested in 
developing its own nuclear weapons: 1) the dangers of a northeast Asian arms race 
that would damage Japan’s international security in the short- and long-term; 2) the 
United States would become infuriated, endangering Japan’s relationship with its 
closest ally (Kamiya cites a 1990 quotation from Major General Henry Stackpole: “No 
one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan….So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will.”); 
and 3) Japan would lose international respect for behaving essentially as another 
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power-hungry wealthy nation, canceling out the respect Japan has earned for not going 
nuclear in spite of its obvious capability (Kamiya 2002: 69).  Some of the sentiments 
mentioned in those rationales for why Japan will not seek nuclear weapons anytime 
soon are echoes of what this paper is really all about, which is why Japan’s postwar 
nice-guy image would be severely jeopardized even by seeking nuclear weapons for 
solely defensive and last-resort purposes. 
     The events of World War II perhaps doomed Japan’s potential as a nuclear 
weapons power indefinitely, but, as much of this paper is about, that may not be the 
entire story.  Northeast Asia, given the volatility matched with its relative calm since 
the 1970s, appears to require very careful treading by its wealthier nations due to the 
fear that may easily be inspired among some of the less-economically powerful 
nations in the locale.  Japan’s nuclear weapons program, or its lack thereof, is 
basically equal to the capability of South Korea and Taiwan, countries that have been 
rightfully deemed innocent in the World War II context.  Therefore, we can be 
positive that the Japanese are not merely held in check by the history of the 1940s.  On 
the other hand, the contexts of each country in the region not pursuing nuclear 
weapons in spite of their ability to do so may be highly unique.  Lacking a regional 
NATO-like network may prevent the wealthy democracies of northeast Asia from 
making themselves into parallels of the United Kingdom and France for western 
Europe (granted, France is no longer a NATO member, but its alliance with the UK is 
basically as solid as any military alliance in the world).   
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     With Japan, the United States was also in a different situation than the one in 
Western Europe following World War II.  The Americans were in a position to 
completely call the shots regarding Japan at the end of the war, whereas Nazi 
Germany had been savagely defeated by a large coalition on German soil.  The 
Americans had annihilated forces on the Japanese homeland essentially by themselves, 
and from the air.  Therefore, following the war, Japan became the United States’ client 
state, enabling the Americans to provide that apparent nuclear umbrella.  That 
provided a particularly national emphasis to that sort of special American protection 
that was more regional in nature in Western Europe.  The wing of the United States 
remains a difficult thing for the Japanese to elude. 
     Again differently from Germany at the end of World War II, it was more 
rhetorically difficult for the Japanese people to escape their particular responsibility 
for the war.  The Nazis reconstructed German society in such an overt fashion that the 
German people were able to be more openly remorseful thanks to the excuse that their 
nation had supposedly been hijacked by a gang of crooks and thugs (arguably true).  
The Japanese, on the other hand, were unmistakably the ones that had embarked on 
the conflict.  The nation of Japan itself had marched across Asia and the Pacific, 
murdering, raping, and pillaging, beneath the country’s imperial banner.  The 
memories of that experience have been mercilessly nurtured in the minds of many in 
East Asia, causing continuing diplomatic problems for many Japanese eager to leave 
behind the crimes of their recent ancestors. 
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The Present Day 
     A factor that cannot be ignored (no matter how complicated it may make things for 
the writer of this paper with regard to Japan) are the recent elections and party changes 
that have occurred in the halls of power in both the United States and Japan.  The year 
2009 brought the inauguration of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United 
States, enabling a total Democratic Party takeover of the U.S. Congress from the 
Republican-led force of George W. Bush that had dominated much of the previous 
eight years, as well as the defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party in the Japanese 
elections that brought the Democratic Party of Japan into power after over five straight 
decades of LDP rule.   
     The DPJ appears to be somewhat different than its LDP predecessors in that it is 
less rhetorically hawkish.  Hawkish is used as a relative term, given that the LDP 
could not actually be overtly hawkish, given the major diplomatic strides made by 
Japan under the LDP’s watch and leadership.  Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said 
after the DPJ takeover of parliament that countries that leave open the possibility of 
their first use of nuclear weapons have no right whatsoever to discuss nuclear 
nonproliferation.  That represented something of a shift from the likes of Shinzo Abe, 
the LDP prime minister who advocated foreign policy harshness and historical 
revisionism.  The current Japanese prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, has stated that 
the anti-nuclear weapons goals of the Obama Administration are perfectly in line with 
his party’s ideology for Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons future (Nishikawa 9/2/09).  
Another article offers a nuclear-oriented opinion of the meaning of the DPJ victory in 
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Japan last year: “…the DPJ’s election sweep should hearten opponents of nuclear 
weapons, for it provides not only a symbolic victory for antinuclear forces but a 
potentially significant shift in the nuclear policy of a major nation (Wittner 9/5/09).”  
By electing a party into power that has very clear anti-nuclear principles, even at the 
risk of the American nuclear umbrella, the Japanese public has sent a very clear 
message of their ideals.   
     A problem of international legislation that would plague Japan if it were to develop 
nuclear weapons would be the entire issue of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself.  The 
following is an important quotation from former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba: 
“We (Japan) would not be able to obtain nuclear fuel….With dependency on nuclear 
power for about 40% of (our) electricity, we would experience a major decline in 
economic activities.  Japan going nuclear would automatically mean the collapse of 
the NPT regime and there would be nuclear countries all around us (Takubo 2009: 
18).”  There, I believe that Ishiba hits on a particularly important diplomatic point, 
along with the certainties of the economic consequences brought about by a resource-
poor country acquiring homemade nuclear weapons.  That point is that Japan is 
undeniably a regional leader in terms of many areas, not the least of which are 
economics, highly-skilled labor, and education.  Though Japan is guilty of many 
crimes of the past against its neighbors, the bitterness stemming from those injustices 
is paired with an admiration of the Japanese that is apparent among Asian countries 
such as South Korea and Taiwan.  Japan’s non-nuclear example over the past several 
46 
 
decades has served as a motivator for the Asian Tigers to match military peace with 
non-nuclear economic ferocity.   
     Similar to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have experienced incredible economic 
expansions since the ends of the conflicts in which their modern selves emerged (the 
Korean War and the Chinese Civil War, respectively) due to an intensively-educated 
workforce and export-oriented industrialization.  Still, those exports were created not 
from homegrown materials entirely, but from the fashioning of imported materials into 
highly-valued technological commodities.  With nuclear weapons entering into the 
mix, all that had been gained would be thrust into jeopardy. 
     The center-left ideologies of the Obama and DPJ leaderships probably make the 
two sides fairly well-suited to one another.  The rise of China as the economic 
superpower of the Asian future is still being evaluated.  The aggressiveness of North 
Korea is verified, but how to go about handling its assertiveness in keeping attention 
on itself remains an issue as far as the weapons needed to combat a further step toward 
war are concerned (mass destruction or conventional, essentially).  However, as 
mentioned in the article by Takubo, the Republican Secretary of Defense under 
President Obama remains wary of changing the paradigm much at this point: “During 
an October 20 (,2009) meeting in Japan with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
Okada told Gates that the Japanese government currently is examining the no-first-use 
issue and that he would like to discuss it with the United States.  Gates responded that 
the flexibility of deterrence is necessary (Takubo 2009: 18).”  Perhaps the evolution of 
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the Obama international security strategy will become more apparent with regard to 
Japan as time goes on.  Major changes have not yet occurred. 
 
Theoretical Implications of the Japan Situation      
     Applying Sagan’s mid-1990s framework in particular to the case of Japan, there are 
arguments as to why developments in Japan have gone the way that they have from all 
three perspectives (security, domestic politics, and norms).  Though Sagan does not 
find the security model for developing or not developing a nuclear weapons program 
particularly persuasive, I would argue otherwise in the case of Japan, to the extent that 
the United States, through its perhaps intentional entanglement with the Japanese 
economy after the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War 
(particularly when the Japanese economy began to emerge as a global financial force), 
provided Japan with a credible enough security guarantee that Japan decided that it did 
not require its own nuclear weapons to deter mainland China, and, more in the modern 
sense, North Korea.  Out of the three countries I am looking at most intensively in this 
paper, I would argue that Japan is burdened with the most extreme of the existential 
threats given its cultural disconnection from China and North Korea, relative to 
Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.  As the crown jewel of the American anti-
communist alliance in Asia, particularly before the ascendance of South Korea and 
Taiwan as modern economies, the United States was willing to risk more of its 
military capital in order to ward away those that would otherwise threaten Japan.  It is 
an open question whether or not the United States would be willing to sacrifice Los 
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Angeles to retaliate for an attack on Tokyo, given that Tokyo is so valuable 
economically to the Americans. 
     Sagan’s domestic politics model is particularly crucial for understanding why the 
Japanese never seriously endeavored to develop nuclear weapons.  The Japanese 
public has remained remarkably steadfast in its habitual rejection of the discussion of 
making the bombs.  Quite differently than the Indian reaction of the 1970s that Sagan 
mentions (1996-97: 68), the Japanese public most likely would react in horror to the 
development of the Japanese government testing a nuclear device successfully.  This is 
in no small way related to the continued emotional resonance that the mushroom cloud 
image plays on the Japanese community, given their unique experience with the bomb.  
Additionally, the financial rewards of abstaining from nuclear weapons in most ways 
(with the exception of occasionally having allowed the Americans onto their soil and 
into their ports with nuclear weapons in tow) has paid off quite well for Japan, 
granting it the unlikely post-World War II position of the world’s second largest 
economy (in spite of having hardly any globally relevant natural resources). 
     The norms model, the approach that seems to have the most relevance to Sagan, 
works for Japan in something of a reversal from Sagan’s proliferation concept of 
nuclear development.  Unlike in de Gaulle’s France, where the pursuit of the weapon 
played into the country’s aspirations of achieving global importance once again (after 
having been temporarily conquered, then losing its overseas empire), East Asia has 
certainly developed its own norm of not possessing nuclear weapons (China, as a legal 
holder of the weapon due to the NPT).  As one of the losing initiators of World War II, 
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Japan is even further socially prohibited by that non-development norm from 
producing the bomb.  The symbolic significance that Sagan mentions when remarking 
on the French nuclear program of half-a-century ago is true in the French case, I 
would argue.  In East Asia, the symbolic significance of the nuclear weapon amounts 
to that of a criminal act outside of the legal holders of the NPT.  Additionally, the 
symbolic significance of the bomb to Japan is obvious to anyone with even a 
rudimentary understanding of the conclusion of World War II.  Sagan is correct, 
though his findings require some specifications to East Asia when relating it to that 
region.       
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3. The South Korean Dilemma 
     The case of South Korea yields some major differences from Japan in terms of its 
nuclear weapons policy.  Differently from Japan, South Korea was not guilty of 
beginning an imperial expansion during the 20th century.  On the contrary, it was 
annexed by Japan in 1910 and suffered a brutal occupation that included the 
desecration of many cultural artifacts, as well as the conscription of its young men to 
fight for the Japanese cause during World War II.  Therefore, the context remains 
somewhat different from that of Japan.  However, the emphasis placed on the Korean 
Peninsula to remain nuclear weapons-free from a variety of different angles has put 
South Korea in much the same political box.   
     At the end of World War II, when the Korean Peninsula was split into spheres of 
influence related to both the capitalist and communist victors of the war, South Korea 
was placed into the hands of a military dictatorship.  Due to the nature of the Japanese 
occupation, South Korea was far behind the technological development of countries 
such as the United States.  It was a destitute and impoverished country, and that was 
only intensified by the Korean War of 1950-53.  Still, as the centerpiece of one of the 
world’s most critical Cold War dynamics and confrontations, South Korea was bound 
to have nuclear weapons on its mind from a relatively young age as an important actor 
on the world stage. 
     Again with different contexts, but with a similar outcome, there were tens of 
thousands of American troops stationed in South Korea following the conclusion of 
the Korean War, which returned the country to essentially status quo ante bellum.  The 
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American influence was a progression that occurred frequently around the world 
during the Cold War, where a paternalistic relationship sprouted over the United States 
involving itself explicitly in the affairs of another country, whether that country 
desired it or not.  In the case of South Korea, it became fairly clear that that attention 
was wanted, at least from the leadership.  South Korea’s military dictators and 
despots, like Synghman Rhee and Chung-hee Park, were more than happy to keep the 
Americans close at hand if it solidified their hold on power. 
 
Dictatorship or Democracy, and the Bomb   
     From the beginning of the current state of affairs, either beginning with South 
Korea’s official independence of 1948, or with the end of the Korean War stalemate in 
1953, the context of South Korea’s nuclear weapons program was destined to be 
inextricably linked to its overall policy regarding North Korea, the economically 
beleaguered national sibling that to this day remains ever separated from its rightful 
government in Seoul.  If South Korea made the choice to develop its own nuclear 
weapons, free from the Americans that it had looking over its shoulder, which already 
itself openly possessed nuclear weapons, a fact the whole world had no choice but to 
accept, then there was always the risk that North Korea would have free political rein 
to do as it wished regarding nuclear weapons.  There had been no indication from the 
states to which North Korea was a client (the Soviet Union and mainland China) that 
there would be stringent rules regarding the proliferation of the North.   
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     Those in power in Seoul still face important choices related to how much political 
capital they are willing to send to the Kim dictatorship in Pyongyang by starting 
nuclear weapons-capable programs.  The following shall be an attempt to explain the 
South Korean nuclear weapons context in terms of the history of the peninsula, as well 
as how more recent events from North Korea have affected the direction that South 
Korea might take if the North grows even more aggressive, and if the United States 
becomes an ever less reliable military ally and benefactor to the Seoul government 
with which it still has a mutual defense treaty. 
     As has been mentioned, it has not been until fairly recently in relative terms that 
South Korea has arguably had the technological capability to construct nuclear 
weapons, or even to consider the prospect of that.  Still, the South Koreans exited the 
Korean War with the motivation to advance technologically and economically because 
of the constantly hovering threat from the aggressive communist world that was 
directly on their only land border.  The following is an excerpt from the article entitled 
“South Korea’s Nuclear Surprise:”  “It was commonly known that from 1968 to 1975 
South Korea attempted to obtain both a plant to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel 
and intermediate-range missile delivery systems.  After 1971, an organized South 
Korean effort to develop a bomb was orchestrated by the Weapons Exploitation 
Committee with presidential-level backing (Kang et al 2005: 42).”  That quotation also 
reiterates something that has already been mentioned, which is that South Korea in no 
way carried the same stigma explicitly against nuclear weapons that Japan did, given 
Japan’s unique history with the use of weapons of mass destruction or its expansionist 
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policies which those atomic bombs were directed against.  As a recovering victim of 
several international conflicts, South Korea probably felt exceptionally QUALIFIED 
politically to possess nuclear weapons. 
     Another important factor that contributed in terms of rhetoric to South Korea’s 
nuclear programs was the military dictatorship that dominated the country at the time, 
led by Chung-hee Park.  As the recipient of generous American favoritism, due to the 
anti-Communist-at-all-costs policies of the United States of the time, the dictator Park 
was able to justify such weapons policies both domestically and almost 
internationally.  However, the program was ultimately thwarted due to American 
pressure.  The United States had enough to worry about with the influence of not just 
North Korea, but its guides of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China.  The 
CIA was also terrified of other factors that might begin to occur if South Korea were 
to gain its own nuclear weapons: “(Donald) Gregg (the CIA station chief in Seoul at 
the time) had no doubt that Japan would have no choice but to develop nuclear 
weapons; South Korea, therefore, would never be allowed to possess 
them…(Funabashi 2007: 145).”  Tensions still persisted enough between Japan and 
South Korea at the time to the extent that South Korean achievement in devising their 
own version of the weapon was synonymous with Japan striking down its non-nuclear 
principles. 
     The similarities in personnel between those that shut down the Park nuclear 
program in the 1970s and those that invaded Iraq under mistaken pretenses are 
striking:  “(Donald) Rumsfeld, secretary of defense in the Gerald Ford 
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administration…visited Seoul to hand the ultimatum to the Park government, saying, 
‘The United States will review the entire relationship with the Republic of Korea 
unless its abandons nuclear development (Funabashi 2007: 145).’”  Park, the 
strongman that had led the way in bringing South Korea as rapidly as he could toward 
the position of being one of the famed Four Tigers of the East Asian economic new 
wave of the late 20th century, had met his international political limits with this 
diplomatic catastrophe.  His embarrassment, however, did not signal the end of the 
program.  However, if the United States had not disrupted the nuclear weapons 
program headed by President Park, the following is a description of what might have 
come to pass: “Today, many South Korean security experts and nuclear scientists, 
some of whom actually took part in President Park’s nuclear weapon program, do not 
hesitate to point out that had the program continued, South Korea could have 
accumulated enough weapon-grade plutonium to manufacture a couple of nuclear 
bombs by the mid-1980s…(Choi et al. 2008: 378).”  The progress that South Korea 
apparently made anyway after Park seemed to convince the Americans that the 
development had ceased in 1975 was formidable, so it really speaks to the headway 
that had already been made that such a goal would have been reached about 25 years 
ago, if not for American diplomatic intervention. 
 
False Promise     
     The signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975 was hoped to be the 
conclusion by many of South Korean nuclear weapons intentions.  As has been 
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discovered, it was not even close to that optimistic assessment.  Throughout the 1980s 
and well into the 1990s, up until South Korea’s ratification of additional International 
Atomic Energy Administration protocols, South Korea embarked on a series of 
nuclear technology experiments that qualified the country as a viable proliferator of 
the kind of weapons technology that we are discussing here.  Though the experiments 
were conducted over the course of a few decades, the progress made in enriching the 
uranium that would be needed to construct a modern nuclear weapons program were 
in place by 2000, when many of the objectionable activities of the South Korean 
government began to be brought into the limelight.   
     Many of the political problems involved in those kinds of activities had to do with 
the South’s unique relationship with the United States.  With the post-NPT ratification 
in 1975, it was shown that South Korea had continued uranium enrichment projects 
that began in 1979.  The United States, being the foremost scolder of North Korean 
weapons policy, was put into an uncomfortable situation.  The tenuous risks of 
international political hypocrisy were apparent, since how could the United States 
insist that North Korea remain faithful to its international obligations to respect such a 
weapons agreement while one of the United States’ main allies was working actively 
to bring nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula through their domestic creation? 
     Aside from the political ramifications of the South Korean’s work on nuclear 
weapons technology among inspection enforcement circles, there is a serious problem 
related to a missed chance to hold North Korea to its own obligations based on the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty to which it belonged at the time.  Given the high probability 
56 
 
of a significant North Korean intelligence presence in South Korea (Kang et al. 2005: 
40), one might wonder how much of the South Korean experiments motivated the 
North Koreans to up the ante on their own nuclear weapons development.  South 
Korea here might also appear to be the political victim of the unique expectations the 
world places on keeping nuclear weapons off of the Korean Peninsula, from both sides 
and their benefactors.  We can gather from the general timeline of South Korea’s 
nuclear weapons development that it was simultaneous with South Korea’s rapid 
transformation into a dynamic first-world economy.  Having been caught with its hand 
in the cookie jar (greatly due to its own compliance with IAEA rules), South Korea 
might be seen as trying to have its cake and eat it, too.  The Americans might also be 
seen as having been complicit with the South Korean nuclear ambitions: “During an 
IAEA inspection (in 2004), South Korean officials could not produce documentation 
or several scientists who were involved in the (uranium) work….That portrayal differs 
significantly from those offered by U.S. officials who have repeatedly praised South 
Korea for coming clean voluntarily and cooperating with the IAEA (Linzer 9/12/04).”  
Given the American commitment that continues to the military protection of South 
Korea, it seems puzzling that the South Koreans would be so insistent (albeit 
secretively) in pressing forward during that timeframe in the process of creating their 
own nuclear weapons.  Perhaps breaking free of the U.S. influence was part of the set 
of factors, similar to the thoughts among those in the upper echelons of power in the 
Japanese government during the 1960s that wanted to avoid the prospect of living 
perpetually under the wing of the United States due to issues of warfare that had 
57 
 
occurred decades before.  Additionally, moving ahead with a nuclear weapons 
program may have been a final step in attempting to reach modernity.  In any case, it 
was once again found out, and the South Koreans had to admit their wrongdoing in 
breaking a variety of agreements, including with its allies. 
     Given the American situation in Iraq and Afghanistan and all of the distractions 
that those raging conflicts entail, the South Korean security definition is currently in a 
state of flux.  The nuclear weapons issue, therefore, will also need to probably be 
reorganized.  What, after all, do nuclear weapons mean in the Asia-Pacific?  Choi and 
Park write: “The possibility of either a decision by South Korea to go nuclear or a 
regional nuclear arms race still seems remote, but neither can be ruled out completely.  
Unless timely and appropriate measures are taken, nonnuclear states in the region, 
including South Korea and Japan, may be compelled to consider their own nuclear 
options (Choi et al. 2008: 392).”  The authors go on to mention that the American 
nuclear umbrella is essentially everything at this point, as far as the query of where 
things are headed in the region.  Even in the modern drive toward peaceful uses of 
nuclear power, South Korea is still somewhat in the diplomatic doghouse because of 
past indiscretions.  The following excerpt succinctly describes that: “Local scientists 
say research into reprocessing and uranium enrichment will help them upgrade and 
export home-grown nuclear reactors and technology.  ‘Washington, however, is 
reluctant to allow reprocessing in South Korea because of its past ambitions on nuclear 
bombs,’ Baek Seung-oo of the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses told AFP (News 
of AP 3/8/10).”  Therefore, we have an additional example of American pressure 
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being a block to an East Asian arms race, in addition to how the cloud of those past 
experiences still hangs over the South Korean nuclear program, even as far as peaceful 
purposes. 
     To get an idea of what South Korea might have been and still is up against, it will 
be necessary to examine and evaluate the nuclear programs of North Korea.  North 
Korea, the archrival of South Korea since the Korean War and a primary opponent of 
the United States since the same conflict, has seemed to have doubled its efforts in 
recent years in constructing a viable nuclear weapons program.  Arguably, this has 
been a response to the rhetoric put forward by the Bush Administration, including the 
declaration of North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” in 2002.  With the 
invasion of Iraq by the US-led Coalition of the Willing in 2003, it probably began to 
seem imperative to North Korea that it should indeed develop weapons of mass 
destruction, given that Iraq, having not possessed them, was successfully conquered, at 
least as far as the dissolution of the Saddam-led Ba’athist government was concerned.  
If North Korea was to remain safe from a government that presented itself as so 
aggressive and hawkish, then seeking nuclear weapons was probably what seemed like 
a good idea for solid defense, and as a deterrent. 
     Pairing the Bush Administration together with the South Korean government that 
had made a habit of concocting schemes to construct their own nuclear weapons, in 
spite of their signing of the non-proliferation treaty, North Korea had a very good 
case, relatively speaking, for embarking on a nuclear weapons-devising journey.  
However, it would be one thing if it had been a recent idea for the wild and 
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unpredictable Kim regime.  As can be shown through history, North Korea has made 
its own habit of trying to put together the nuclear puzzle. 
 
Theoretical Implications of the South Korea Situation      
     The theoretical applications of South Korea’s nuclear weapons abstinence equal 
those of Japan.  As with the two other case studies, South Korea’s outside threat 
appears to be obvious, thanks to North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric, but the capability 
of the North Koreans to conventionally oppose South Korea has become minimal over 
the last few decades.  Again, the American guarantee rings true in the South Korean 
case, especially given that tens of thousands of American troops remain as part of the 
US Forces Korea (USFK), even when the American military has been terribly 
overstretched thanks to the other theaters of the War on Terrorism.  Part of the 
Americans’ prestige was granted to them through their treatment of the client states, 
which South Korea still arguably remains.  South Korea’s flirtation with developing a 
nuclear weapon has lingered until recently enough in the past that such a conclusion 
becomes somewhat difficult to uphold, but it barely justifies the idea.  It has not been 
until the past decade that South Korea has truly ascended into the upper echelons of 
the global economic powerhouses, so it was originally somewhat different from the 
American defense of Japan.  Holding off the communist world from the capitalist 
world in general was probably more important to the Americans politically than the 
actual defense of South Korea itself. 
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     The domestic politics model of Sagan’s paper is a bit more complicated in South 
Korea than in Japan.  With the turnover in power of the last few years from the 
unification advocates to the more center-right pro-American hawks led by Lee 
Myung-Bak, South Korean voters have shown their idiosyncratic tendencies and fickle 
nature in relating to their North Korean brethren.  The militarization of South Korea in 
response to the lingering North Korean threat is never really in question, but the 
nuclear weapons issue gives the public pause.  This has only increased as the North 
Koreans have developed nuclear weapons.  With the ability to build them if things 
truly went down the drain (and the North Koreans know that), the South Koreans are 
probably more inclined as a people to hold off.  A great similarity to the Japanese 
domestic politics model is that of a natural resource-dry country relying on its export-
oriented economic development.  This requires a great deal of international 
cooperation, and building a nuclear bomb would threaten all of that.  The South 
Korean monopolies, or chaebols, of Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia, and LG Group, 
among a relatively few others, which control much of the country politically, socially, 
culturally, and economically, would have their bottom lines threatened by a 
democratic yet still corporatist government that developed a tactical nuclear device.  
The power of the investor is nowhere greater than in South Korea or in South Korean 
politics. 
     As with Japan, South Korea is subject to the reversal I maintain of Sagan’s norms 
model.  As part of the family of mature nations of northeast Asia, South Korea’s 
international prestige would not be enhanced by its ownership of nuclear weapons.  
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With the potential dangers that surround South Korea, the dabbling that occurred in 
the country with nuclear weapons until 2000 must be amounted to the activities of 
fools and scientific thrill-seekers.  The workings on nuclear weapons prior to the 
signing of the NPT in 1975 can be amounted to a reactionary non-democratic 
government that did not seek global prestige as much as it sought a regional defense 
mechanism to sustain itself and hold off a somewhat more advanced existential threat.  
In South Korea’s modern democratic period, South Korea has gained prestige as the 
more responsible of the two Koreas through holding off on nuclear weapons of its own 
and leaving the security umbrella of that respect to the United States.   
 
The North Korean Antithesis      
     North Korea’s nuclear weapons efforts greatly predate those of South Korea.  
Arguably, the South Koreans were merely responding to the nuclear threat directly 
posed by North Korea for decades.  The following is an excerpt that describes some of 
these developments: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) began its 
nuclear effort as far back as the mid-1950s and was originally assisted by the Soviet 
Union, which helped establish an atomic energy research center in 1962, and China, 
which aided the North’s uranium mining effort (Carpenter et al. 2004: 39).”  
Therefore, the end of the Korean War basically ushered in the era of North Korea 
actively seeking nuclear weapons.  Additionally, the superpowers of the Communist 
world, the USSR and China, were proactive in helping North Korea achieve that goal, 
at least for a time.  Still, their assistance could not have been tireless, given that North 
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Korea never reached the level of nuclear weapons achievement that they did.  These 
activities served as plenty of domestic political justification for those like Chung-hee 
Park to devise their own nuclear programs.  In the end, the United States did show 
itself to be the more responsible of the respective benefactors in halting South Korea’s 
nuclear program, at least once it became public knowledge. 
     North Korea became quite skillful at using diplomatic means in order to covertly 
secure assistance with nuclear weapons developments.  The following is another 
excerpt that outlines some of the details surrounding this: “North Korea joined the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974, giving the country’s scientists 
access to technical assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Over the years the 
DPRK constructed a 5-megawatt reactor and began building a 50-megawatt reactor at 
a complex at Yongbyon.  North Korea even started construction on a 200-megawatt 
reactor in 1985 (Carpenter et al. 2004: 39-40).”  This highlights the intensification of 
North Korea’s efforts to construct new means of nuclear technology following the 
initial dissolution of the South Korean domestic nuclear weapons program that was 
enabled by the United States. 
     The real problems began just a bit later.  North Korea made some promises it did 
not have any intention of keeping: “North Korea also signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985.  But even at that early date there were 
questions about the sincerity of Pyongyang’s commitment.  As Mohamed 
ElBaradei…notes, North Korea took seven years to sign the obligatory verification 
agreement with the IAEA, a process that takes most signatories about 18 months 
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(Carpenter et al. 2004: 40).”  Therefore, there is a question of how much the signing of 
the NPT by North Korea was ever to be taken seriously.  Given even the anti-
diplomatic mayhem that has occurred with North Korea’s weapons program of the 
past few years, the country has proven itself untrustworthy at best when relying on it 
to keep its agreements that could be described as blackmail. 
 
Korea Entangled 
     There are many different angles to consider when describing how the weapons 
development by the North Koreans could feed into potential development by the South 
Koreans.  Given the reluctance of the Park government to continue working on nuclear 
weapons to the extent that they did in the 1970s, it is obvious that even a rather bold, 
militaristic dictatorship was not willing to sacrifice much of its economic future 
(which was being delivered to South Korea on a silver platter thanks to a Mutual 
Defense Treaty that ensured significant military protection from the greatest military 
power in the world) in order to gain nuclear weapons to match an adversary.  
Politically speaking, there are many questions that could be posed to South Korea as to 
why it would seek nuclear weapons, even when the United States has promised to 
stand by in the case of a Communist attack.  Does South Korea not want to appear as a 
complacent, decadent locale, ripe for plunder by its Communist brethren?  Some 
might argue so.  With all of the close calls to a second Korean War breakout, South 
Korea might continue to be interested in all of the methods at its disposal to ensure 
that the North Koreans are fully aware of their economic and military inferiority. 
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     Something that might be a well-known fact but which I will reiterate here anyway 
is that North Korea has not done itself any favors with the sheer lunacy with which it 
releases statements regarding its international opponents.  In a way, the fact that North 
Korea doth protest too much might be seen as indicating that it is producing nuclear 
weapons when it claims that it does not.  The following is a sample from the North 
Korean-published “Open Letter on Nuclear Arms Development in South Korea:”  
“…the south Korean nuclear maniacs are working to build reprocessing facilities to 
extract more uranium….Having accumulated a large quantity of nuclear explosives, 
south Korea has practically developed nuclear arms.  The promotion of an atomic 
reactor design in the 1980s was geared to obtaining technical data on atomic bombs 
from abroad (1992).”  The wild assertions might have been predicated somewhat on 
the relatively recent overthrow of the military regime and paradigm that had 
dominated South Korean politics since its independence.  Though South Korea was 
still working on nuclear weapons at the time, to an extent, the claims made by North 
Korea in terms of South Korea’s nuclear weapons readiness, as far as tactical and 
damage-inducing purposes, were questionable.   
     The influence of mainland China on North Korean policy and probabilities cannot 
be underestimated or understated.  One could easily think that, without the assistance 
of China, North Korea’s ruling regime would fall and the country would plunge into 
even further chaos than the form of it in which it currently finds itself.  If North Korea 
were to go fully nuclear, China might have its own political and security disaster on its 
hands: “(A) danger or indirect threat to China is that North Korean nuclearization 
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might induce Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to develop their own nuclear arms.  
China has not forgotten that in the past South Korea and Taiwan both have attempted 
to develop nuclear weapons.  Also, although Japan has consistently taken a non-
nuclear policy stance, if it were to go nuclear, that could drastically change the 
international environment in East Asia (Funabashi 2007: 301).”  The balance of power 
in and of itself within the region would be thrown off entirely.  The current paradigm 
would be brought to a complete and dramatic close.  If North Korea were to confirm 
its ability and willingness to develop its own nuclear weapons, it might be difficult to 
blame South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan for abandoning their current non-nuclear 
policies.  Their prosperity has been built in large part on their lack of nuclear weapons, 
but if all of that prosperity could then be obliterated by nuclear weapons from one of 
the most corrupt, crazed, and tenuous dictatorial regimes on the planet, the need for 
true deterrence and the assurance of the complete destruction of North Korea in the 
case of an attack on South Korea or Japan may become politically necessary for those 
countries. 
     North Korea’s gradual persistence related to issues of nuclear weapons 
proliferation is very well tied in to some of the objectives of this thesis.  There is 
clearly a choice present in northeast Asia insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned, 
along with their relationship to an overall level of social and economic development.  
Whenever South Korea, on the other hand, got too far along in its nuclear 
development process, to the point where it was caught with its hand in the cookie jar, 
it would relent and back down, because South Korea was not willing to sacrifice the 
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gains that it had made in other areas simply so that it could own its own version of 
such advanced weapons.   North Korea is an utter and destitute failure of a state.  
Ruled with an iron fist by Kim Jong-Il, the elderly boy emperor, the country is on its 
knees financially due to rigorous and tough international sanctions, along with it being 
seen basically as a pariah state, with only mainland China present to correct some of 
its most severe transgressions (both in terms of international relations and the running 
of its domestic economy). 
 
The Importance of Fate, Destiny, and Human Decisions   
     Enough time has gone by since the end of the Korean War that one might wonder 
what could have happened, if, at various points, North Korea had chosen to take 
options that were alternative to what it enacted.  If the regime had made a choice (or if 
a revolution could have been staged), it seems possible that North Korea ultimately 
could have emerged from the Cold War frame of reference with a different perspective 
on the world, which would entail the world holding a different perspective of North 
Korea.  South Korea was by no means as popular of a country internationally as it is 
now, due to its dictatorial and militaristic form of government, but it emerged from 
such an outdated style, and has become one of the most respected and economically 
prolific countries in the world, which is quite something, given what it was only a few 
decades ago. 
     Many might argue that North Korea has become locked into its role in the region as 
the poor, downtrodden figure that requires force in order to get anyone to pay much 
67 
 
attention to it.  North Korea has been at odds with the United States almost longer than 
any other country in the world, and its survival might be seen as having depended on 
its steadfast political positioning.  Gavan McCormack writes: “Nuclear weapons 
development had been seen as a means to two ends: security and the normalization of 
relations with the world.  Without nuclear weapons North Korea was a poor and 
insignificant country; with them – perhaps only with them – it might command the 
attention of the United States and Japan (McCormack 2004: 153-154).”  North 
Korea’s insistence on the development of nuclear weapons technology, in spite of its 
bogus agreements, signatures, and supposed ratifications, has only served to 
perpetuate its standing as a second- or even third-class nation.  Its counterpart, South 
Korea, was smart enough in its governmental policies to recognize that it could 
develop nuclear weapons through a concerted effort on the part of its many qualified 
scientists and engineers, but it would lead to a great deal of international trouble.  The 
price would have been too high, particularly for a country like South Korea that is so 
poor in natural resources, similar to Japan. 
     Perhaps North Korea’s chance to become a respected nation has passed, and they 
are forever fated to be a trouble for the world, including to their only real remaining 
ally, communist China.  Not only are the Koreas a perfect contrast between capitalist 
and communist outcomes (with some particularly Korean traits working their way into 
both cases), but also what happens when generally responsible leaders (even when 
they appear to be dictators) make the right choices that lead their countries to the 
promised lands of international dignity and respect, or when their leaders instead 
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decide to persist in their aggressive tactics that only further alienate them from the 
international community.  To emphasize this, another quote from McCormack is 
useful when comparing Japan and North Korea: “…two neighbor states, one a global 
economic superpower, the other bankrupt, isolated, and almost universally reviled 
(McCormack 2004: 121).”  In my opinion, that kind of international reputation and 
state of affairs represents a failure in diplomatic effort from the leadership of the 
country.  Many countries are poor, but the isolation and poor international opinion 
maintained by North Korea is fairly unique in the modern day.  It is due to a sustained 
failure in the leadership of North Korea to recognize that its impetuousness and lack of 
compromise in its outward attitudes have led the world to writing it off.  Even China 
has grown tired of North Korea’s childish games, and even signed on to an anti-North 
Korea United Nations Security Council resolution in 2009.   
     Another problem that North Korea represents for those not wishing to employ a 
double standard in their judgments on nation-states is that it makes questionable 
decisions by the United States more politically convenient on the international stage.  
As mentioned by Nina Tannenwald, North Korea’s missile programs have encouraged 
the United States to engage in wasteful projects: “Many domestic and foreign 
observers do not find the rogue state rationale for US missile defense sufficiently 
persuasive, since neither of the principal adversaries that missile defense supporters 
have in mind – North Korea and Iran – currently possesses the capability to attack the 
United States with ballistic missiles (Tannenwald 2007: 385).”  However, as 
Tannenwald points out, the countries like North Korea that are deemed to be rogue 
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states play into the hands of the United States in perpetuating its role as the global 
policeman, since the United States has retained a sufficient amount of global political 
capital relative to North Korea that the United States could sink fairly low and still 
come out of the game ahead of the beleaguered North Koreans. 
     North Korea’s bargaining power without nuclear weapons is further diminished due 
to its shoddy positioning of its armed forces relative to the forces that would be 
arrayed against it in the event of a conventional attack on South Korea.  The economic 
realities of near-autarky are brought painfully to life in the case of North Korea: “Over 
the years, the conventional military balance on the peninsula has shifted against North 
Korea.  US and South Korean forces have modernized and strengthened their military 
capabilities, while North Korea’s forces suffer from economic deprivation, obsolete 
equipment, poor maintenance and inadequate training (Samore et al. 2007: 62-63).”  
While the North Korean military has grown increasingly pathetic over the decades 
since the height of the Cold War, when North Korea might have had a more distinct 
military advantage on the peninsula, the situation has brought to life the rationale for 
the continued quest for nuclear weaponry.  What other bargaining chip is there?  
Through agreements and various other kinds of blackmail, North Korea can at least 
use the threat of further development of nuclear armaments to get some of its people 
(if only those in its military) some degree of the basic necessities of life. 
     The many misdeeds of North Korea, along with its aggressive episodes and lack of 
predictable behavior from its leaders, serve to show how South Korea received merely 
a few slaps on the wrist, metaphorically speaking, when its nuclear weapons 
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development activities were revealed to the world.  South Korea might have been in a 
much more feasible position than many other countries in the world to try to justify 
why it was trying to construct such frightening weapons and technologies.  North 
Korea has earned itself such a poor reputation not just from the countries it was 
formerly at war with, but from many of its current and previous military allies, that 
South Korea was somewhat let off the hook after it showed that it had indeed been 
working on nuclear weapons.  Who could blame them?  Of course, there were political 
issues with other countries in northeast Asia, along with its American benefactor, but 
North Korea seemed unwilling or unable to back down from its blustery talk about one 
day recapturing the entirety of the Korean Peninsula.   
     One thing that is easily noticed once one begins to study in detail the North Korean 
nuclear weapons program is that rarely does one encounter a nuclear program with 
such a great degree of ambiguity.  Due to the fact that North Korea might be the most 
secretive and closed-off country in the entire world, it is supremely difficult, even for 
the mighty United States intelligence community, to determine exactly what is going 
on.  North Korea goes to such lengths to keep track intensively of the few foreigners 
that are allowed into the country that a cigar could hardly be lit inside of North Korea 
without its leaders being aware of it.  There have been very few chances for spies from 
South Korea, Japan, or the West to gain much information that could lead to anything 
constructive with North Korea.  In the case of such espionage, South Korea is at a 
severe disadvantage due to its relatively open and liberal society.  By granting itself 
the good international reputation that North Korea denied itself through its totalitarian 
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and despotic policies, South Korea has also opened itself to extreme risks of North 
Korean interference in its domestic activities, and that includes the burgeoning nuclear 
programs that it has gotten up and running every once in a while.   
     I hope that is has become obvious that by discussing North Korea in such detail 
that I am endeavoring to thereby describe South Korea’s logic in going about the 
course that it has chosen over the last few decades.  Even during its time of military 
rule, South Korea consistently made ultimate choices that led to the fortuitous state 
that the country finds itself in today.  North Korea, South Korea’s disgruntled 
permanent relative, made errors in collective judgment that have forced the country to 
remain in historical stasis.  The context of North Korea’s nuclear program is one of 
trying to find bargaining chips, whereas the context of South Korea’s nuclear program 
is a mistake that could be corrected through dismantling the entire operation. 
 
Sometimes Awkward Alliances 
     Other writers find some degree of fault in the traditional American interpretation of 
how dangerous North Korea is.  Though the actual military challenges presented by an 
opponent like North Korea are not to be underestimated, it is relatively easy to 
understand how it might be in the best interest of the United States in the region 
(however cynical that assessment is) to keep North Korea handy as the ever-present 
bad guy.  J.J. Suh writes: “…North Korea’s material capabilities and intentions are 
embedded in discourses, and are seen and understood only in such discursive terms.  
The persistence of the ‘threat’ is then used to justify the continuation of the alliance 
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that had been ‘born in blood, forged in the crucible of war’… (Suh 2004: 161).”  Suh’s 
argument presents an alternative viewpoint that may be important to consider when 
analyzing how dangerous North Korea might be.  Since the country is so isolated and 
disconnected from most international interactions, assessments might oftentimes be 
based on the political convenience of those who have the greatest interest in seeing 
North Korea as a constant adversary.  The alliance between the United States and 
South Korea has been very lucrative financially and politically for both parties.  North 
Korea, obviously, has been the primary instrument for keeping that close relationship 
going.  However, one thing that I would argue is that it is more important to focus on 
the primary objectives at hand with the alliance, as far as its purpose.  Unfortunately, it 
seems practically inevitable that there are forces at work in both the United States and 
South Korea that would prefer that North Korea remain separated forever.  A lot of 
money moves based on that assumption.  North Korea has not done itself any favors 
by continually reinforcing a lot of the discursive assumptions that Suh mentions with 
its wild, rash, and unpredictable/inexplicable behavior. 
     The United States has remained remarkably hands-off with North Korea since the 
end of the Korean War, which, in a sense, might lend more credibility to the fact that 
North Korea might have something that the United States would be afraid of.  Rather 
than the low-hanging fruit of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, North Korea 
presents a real strategic challenge for the anti-North Korea allies in terms of thinking 
about a possible invasion.  North Korea certainly has nuclear weapons of some kind, 
and preventing a response to the beginning of an allied strike would be a difficult thing 
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to achieve.  It is more likely, though, that American allies would take most of the brunt 
of the retaliation rather than the Americans themselves.  The following is an excerpt 
from the book On Nuclear Terrorism: “North Korea has poor relations with most of 
the world already, does not cooperate in securing its nuclear weapons and materials, 
and cannot retaliate against the United States in the same ways that Russia, or even 
Pakistan, can.  Threatening to retaliate against North Korea should materials used in a 
nuclear attack be traced back to it would thus be relatively cost-free (Levi 2007: 131-
132).”  In referring to what actions the United States could take in deterring North 
Korea from bad behavior, Levi points out the leverage that the United States has in 
threatening North Korea in the case of North Korean-originating nuclear materials 
ending up being used in a nuclear terrorist attack.  In the scenario that Levi portrays, 
the United States would accumulate additional political capital in a forum such as the 
UN Security Council because North Korea’s semi-allies of China and Russia would 
abandon it to an even greater degree.  If the United States went on the offensive 
against North Korea, South Korea and Japan would have to absorb some of the 
blowback, but there would not be much that the North Koreans could do to ultimately 
respond.  Because of these limitations, North Korea is always walking a fine line when 
playing the recent role of the international troublemaker. 
     North Korea’s continued existence will most likely be assured by its longtime 
benefactor, China, for quite some time.  China has a variety of goals in mind when it 
determines its North Korean policy, most of which hover around pure nationalistic 
self-interest.  If the Kim regime were to collapse in North Korea, China would have to 
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confront a bevy of problems.  One of these is mentioned in the book Blowback: 
“China’s greatest worry has been that the Communist state in the North may collapse 
due to economic isolation and ideological irrelevance, thereby bringing about a 
unified, independent, and powerful new actor in northeast Asian politics, potentially 
the size of and as rich as the former West Germany and defended by a good army, 
possibly armed with nuclear weapons – not a development the Chinese would 
necessarily welcome (Johnson 2000: 136).”  To back that point up, Johnson mentions 
that the United States, in the interest of disrupting Chinese goals, particularly at such a 
time of diplomatic awkwardness between China and the U.S., should do everything it 
can in order to bring about the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, whatever the 
form.  Johnson also makes an important point for this paper (in order to show how the 
North Korean regime might continue to harbor its own bitterness about South Korean 
achievements of the last few decades, perpetuating negative relations), which is that 
North Korea, in terms of gross domestic product per capita, was superior to that of 
South Korea until at least 1975 (Johnson 2000: 119).  That particular statistic can be 
used to emphasize the remarkable economic progress that South Korea has made since 
its capitalist expansion, and it is also fairly well tied in to the downfall of the Park 
regime and the ultimate drive toward the democratization of South Korea.  The 
simultaneity of both developments seemed to present at the very least an interesting 
coincidence. 
     The issue of the relationship between China and North Korea is fairly dynamic, and 
probably much more so than the relationship between North Korea and the United 
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States, which has remained remarkably stable over the last 57 years.  China, still North 
Korea’s greatest and perhaps only real ally, has become frustrated as of late with the 
relentlessness with which North Korea is determined to remain in the past in terms of 
style (meanwhile, North Korea obviously yearns for much more modern weapons 
technology).  As China has moved on from the Maoist paradigm quite successfully, 
North Korea seems locked into its Stalinist dictatorship, moving from one Kim to the 
next, each as bad and as untrustworthy as the other.  The juxtaposition of China’s 
dependence on the Kim regime for its own purposes with its continued frustration with 
North Korea’s antics are mentioned in short in this excerpt: “China voted in favor of 
the UN Security Council’s resolution against North Korea’s nuclear test, but it has 
largely continued to provide economic assistance to North Korea, especially the oil 
supply that is indispensable to North Korea’s military maintenance (Shi 2009: 176).”  
The author also includes quotations from the Chinese government in 2006 that 
described the nuclear testing actions of North Korea as “flagrant” and “brazen” (Shi 
2009: 176).  The calculus and limitations with which China regards North Korea are 
difficult to pin down precisely.  In a way, they are somewhat similar to the United 
States, in which North Korea is momentarily soothed or wooed with resources, but 
when things again become inconvenient, North Korea has a pattern of lashing out, 
which can leave even its most reliable ally a little peeved, and it can create a cold 
feeling between the two. 
     The author of that excerpt, Shi, goes on to  describe how, much in part thanks to 
China’s ratification of the UN Security Council resolutions of late that have been 
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meant to punish North Korea for its variety of transgressions, North Korea has come 
to mistrust China to a large extent.  This unprecedented, unparalleled isolation may 
make one wonder how sustainable the current path is for North Korea.  China’s 
relatively new and fruitful economic relationships with South Korea and Japan, the 
allies of the United States and the traditional adversaries of North Korea, have also 
caused relations between the two states to become strained, even in spite of the goals 
that China has in mind for the Kim regime (not the least of which is the prevention of 
the millions of refugees that would come pouring into China in the event of the 
collapse or destabilization of the Kim dictatorship). 
     A factor with which it is important to take note when discussing the relationship 
between the United States and its allies in northeast Asia is the transition in 2009 from 
the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration.  The aggressive and abrupt 
hawkishness of the Bush Administration soured many of the United States’ allies on 
the country’s foreign policy, even when it came to the issue of North Korea.  President 
Bush was so unpopular among even many of the traditional allies of the United States 
that North Korea did not get as much attention as it could or should have while the 
Bush Administration was asking for it, simply because the ambivalence toward the 
United States at the time was too strong.  After the inauguration of Barack Obama, the 
world began to have a much more positive feeling toward American leadership 
because of the more subtle footprint to be left by American policymakers.   
     At close to the same time, the presidential position in South Korea shifted from the 
more dovish, Sunshine Policy-advocating Roh Moo-Hyun to the more hawkish and 
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pro-American Lee Myung-Bak.  The Lee presidency in South Korea has seen much 
tougher stances by the South Koreans toward North Korea than during the 
appeasement years that began around 2000 with the (heartwarming though misguided) 
diplomatic efforts started by President Kim Dae-Jung, for which he won the Nobel 
Peace Prize.  It will be interesting and necessary to analyze how the foreign relations 
of the United States continue to unfold in northeast Asia, particularly because of the 
issue of North Korea, the one part of the world that has remained very much the same 
throughout the Cold War and even further onward. 
     Sagan’s models of nuclear proliferation patterns become somewhat mysterious in 
the case of North Korea.  Perhaps it is because of North Korea’s rejection of the 
parameters of Sagan’s nuclear excuses and justifications that it has become the pariah 
of the area, even to its major benefactor, mainland China.  As far as Sagan’s norms 
model in regard to North Korea, I would argue along these lines: North Korea’s 
leaders have misread their own region’s nuclear weapons context.  They have adopted 
a de Gaulle style justification, where they believe that nuclear weapons ownership will 
add to their nation’s grandeur.  However, they have fallen short, given that greater 
prestige is obtained in northeast Asia through the lack of nuclear weapons 
development (with the exception of NPT-legal China), particularly when a country has 
the capacity to develop them (all the more politically impressive, perhaps).  By forging 
ahead on such a dangerous and anachronistic path, North Korea has only given its 
opponents more reason to impose sanctions upon it and to find international 
cooperation through resolutions against it. 
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4. The Taiwan Strait and the Bomb      
     Taiwan is another major case of an Asian de facto country that has managed to 
sacrifice the prospects of its own nuclear weapons possession in the meantime in order 
to gain better international trust and respect, similar to Japan and South Korea.  
Constantly being claimed by the much larger Communist mainland, Taiwan might 
naturally be as likely a candidate as any for finding political justification for 
possessing nuclear weapons.  That would be for their purpose as a deterrent against a 
mainland attack.  However, with the exception of some dalliances in the direction of 
gaining nuclear weapons technology that the United States had to help scrap as 
projects, the Taiwanese have remained relatively firm toward their own non-nuclear 
policies and principles. 
     Having been led by a government that was on the losing side of the Chinese Civil 
War in the late 1940s, after China had been one of the successful Allies of World War 
II, the Republic of China on Taiwan was dominated by the Kuomintang party, led by 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.  Similarly to South Korea, Taiwan spent much of its 
early existence as its own de facto state under the firm hand of a dictator.  As the 
Taiwanese economy grew ever more dynamic, the Kuomintang was able to take plenty 
of the credit for those developments, given that hardly any other entity had any kind of 
a legislative voice.  Similarities could also be drawn to Japan, with Japan’s one-party 
democracy that persisted remarkably until 2009, with the leadership of the LDP. 
     Being something of an Israel in east Asia, with mainland China playing the part of 
the Arab states of the Middle East, Taiwan lived under fire (and still does) from the 
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threat of a mainland Chinese invasion, in order that the communists could reclaim the 
island that they felt was rightfully theirs.  Also, as with South Korea, Taiwan 
obviously feels a comradeship and shared history with the mainland, given that most 
on Taiwan are descended from mainlanders that fled there only several decades ago.  
For example, Sun Yat-Sen is viewed as a national hero both on the mainland and in 
Taiwan.  Also demonstrated until the relatively recent economic explosion on the 
mainland are the benefits of relatively free market export-oriented economic policies 
that Taiwan carried out, compared with the numerous economic disasters that plagued 
Maoist China in the early years after their victory in the civil war.  Like the two 
Koreas, capitalism won out in the direct comparison, at least for a time.   
     With its aversion toward Mao Zedong and the Communist developments that were 
occurring in China after the joint victory over Imperial Japan, the United States had a 
clear favorite in the dispute between the KMT and the Communists.  Chiang Kai-Shek 
was no great standard-bearer for the democratic values that the United States often 
espouses internationally, but he was certainly no Communist, and therefore, in the 
early years of the Cold War, the United States really had no choice.  Though it cannot 
be as open and explicit in its support of Taiwan, for reasons of diplomatic recognition 
and by being relatively polite to the mainland for economic reasons, the United States 
continues to lend Taiwan most of the support it needs at any given time to deter a 
Chinese invasion of the island.  Unlike with South Korea, it would be unacceptable to 
the mainland Chinese for American forces to be stationed on Taiwan, but for most of 
the other things that occur between the United States and Taiwan, China is willing to 
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let them slide at the moment because it would have to absorb a tremendous amount of 
political heat if China grew any more bold about reclaiming Taiwan than it already has 
been. 
 
The Bomb as Diplomatic Initiator      
     Since it is not acknowledged widely as its own state, Taiwan cannot necessarily be 
a party to many of the agreements that might internationally legislate such armaments 
as nuclear weapons and their proliferation.  However, if Taiwan were to acquire 
nuclear weapons, the aftermath of that becoming public would certainly shake East 
Asia to the core, just as it would if Japan or South Korea were to become outright 
nuclear weapons-possessing states.  Therefore, the United States, wishing to pursue 
much of the status quo in East Asia, since it has worked well for the United States in 
recent decades, would be willing to do a great deal in order to prevent Taiwan from 
going down that treacherous road.  Particularly given that Taiwan’s progenitor of 
mainland China was one of the original declaratory nuclear-weapons holding states 
and a member of the UN Security Council, in addition to the fact that mainland China 
still claims Taiwan as its own territory, the Republic of China has practically a zero-
level of justification or leeway in developing any kind of nuclear weapons research 
program.  That explains why the United States is terrified by the prospect of Taiwan 
becoming a nuclear weapons state, especially since the United States is so deeply 
indebted to China, given that it is the world’s largest holder of American treasury 
bonds.   
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     Taiwan must also be acknowledged for what it has gained by not becoming a 
nuclear weapons state.  Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is very sparse in terms of 
natural resources.  Therefore, it has had to rely on other factors in order to build its 
economy to the impressive per capita level that it occupies today.  A highly-educated 
population has enabled Taiwan to become a very trade-dependent, and, by necessity 
due to that dependence, a fairly well-liked and popular country.  If Taiwan were to 
become despised and reviled, and if it were also to violate a number of treaties, its 
economy would be shaken, since it does not possess a lot of the materials that are 
required to keep its economy moving. 
     Lately, Taiwan and mainland China have reached something of an equilibrium or 
stable point, in order that war has not increased in likelihood a great deal.  This has 
been enhanced thanks to the Four No’s of Taiwan’s President Chen in 2000: “(1) not 
to call a referendum on changing the status quo in regard to Taiwan’s independence; 
(2) not to write ‘the two-state theory’ or the concept of ‘state-to-state relations’ 
between the island and the mainland in the constitution; (3) not to seek to change 
Taiwan’s name or flag; and (4) not to declare independence (Zagoria 2007: 12).”  
Going back to the comparison that was made between North Korea and South Korea, 
in which South Korea has yielded much better international and economic results than 
North Korea has in the long-run due to its more pragmatic policy, Taiwan’s 
government is well aware of the tenuous situation that it is always resting within.  The 
mainland is its economic superior (if perhaps not yet its military superior), and also 
has something of a compelling claim to the island of Taiwan, so it is in Taiwan’s best 
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interest to avoid amplifying too much nationalistic rhetoric on Taiwan, since that 
would force China’s hand in trying to make a seizure of what it considers to be its own 
territory. 
     China’s real hand is partially shown through its relatively calm acceptance of the 
American protection of Taiwan through a variety of security agreements and 
armaments deals.  Though it cannot outright send American troops to defend Taiwan, 
risking a skirmish with Chinese troops in the process, the United States has sold 
Taiwan a great deal of American-manufactured military equipment.  The high-tech 
armaments that Taiwan has received would put the mainland at a great deal of risk in 
the event of an invasion attempt.  Not only would many Chinese ships be sunk and 
aircraft shot down, but much of the mainland would be in ruins due to Taiwanese 
missile strikes.  When these American arms deals are publicized and discussed in the 
news media, China obviously harrumphs and expresses its displeasure, but it continues 
its trade relationship with the United States in much the same way that it has.  
American consumers still remain too valuable to China for China to want to risk its 
relationship with the United States any more than the Americans do.  The status quo 
appears to be taking over, and the Obama presidency, though different from the Bush 
Administration in many ways, seems to be keeping the Taiwan policy essentially 
intact and uninterrupted from that era. 
     There are many things the United States is doing, in addition to discouraging the 
Taiwanese from embarking on creating their own nuclear weapons and armaments, in 
order to perpetuate the current state of affairs between the Chinese and the Taiwanese.  
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Donald Zagoria discusses some of these factors: “The United States, for its part, is 
now adeptly combining a policy of deterrence and reassurance for both China and 
Taiwan.  U.S. policy is principally on target….The United States continues to tell both 
China and Taiwan that it opposes unilateral action by either side that seeks to change 
the status quo.  In line with this position, the United States seeks to deter any use of 
force by China and any provocative action by Taiwan (Zagoria 2007: 12).”  Zagoria 
also mentions how the United States is endeavoring to encourage and foster greater 
cultural and economic integration between the two sides of the Formosa Strait.  He 
also points out a quotation from George W. Bush in 2001, which is important in 
emphasizing the real objective of American policy with regard to Taiwan that 
continues with President Obama: “(The United States will do) whatever it takes (to 
ensure Taiwan’s security).”  The parallel with Israel is again echoed, since the United 
States often makes similar proclamations of its loyalty to its best friend in the Middle 
East region.  Since the United States has backed up much of its pro-Taiwan rhetoric 
with calculable actions through its arms deals, the point is made about how important 
the United States has deemed Taiwan to be to the future of American power in East 
Asia.  With many of the diplomatic setbacks of recent years endured by the United 
States, perhaps the Americans feel that they need to hang on dearly to any friends that 
they may still have. 
     Rhetorically, China has not been completely subdued in terms of accepting the 
security dynamics between the United States and Taiwan.  The following excerpt 
makes clear the domestic politics within China that are at work on the Taiwan issue: 
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“…Chinese officials and government commentaries make clear their strong opposition 
to US efforts to support Taiwan and to foster political change in China, as well as key 
aspects of US alliances, security presence around China’s periphery and positions on 
salient international issues ranging from the military use of space to fostering 
democratic change (Sutter 2009: 202).”  Part of the problem in China is that Taiwan is 
a very good way of igniting the more hawkish sensibilities of the population.  
Whenever nationalistic fervor is needed or would be useful, Taiwan is a perfectly 
suitable punching bag for the Chinese.  
 
A Northeast Asian Pattern?  
     Moving forward into the specifics of the aspiring Taiwanese nuclear weapons 
program, one thing that is noticed when studying these subjects is how similar the 
timeframes are respectively between the South Korean and Taiwanese developments 
along these lines.  Since South Korea and Taiwan have had such amazing economic 
ascendancies over the past few decades, perhaps it makes sense that their histories of 
the second half of the twentieth century and onward share some similarities.  The two 
together became half of the famed Four Tigers of the Asia-Pacific region.  I would 
argue that that fame would have been infamy if their nuclear programs had gone any 
further. 
     The beginnings of Taiwan’s nuclear program are difficult to pin down precisely, 
but the nuclear weapons achievements of mainland China in the 1960s are certainly 
seen as the primary motivators behind Taiwan’s aspirations.  The following is from an 
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article that goes over the Taiwanese nuclear process: “Although the United States had 
pledged to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion and even stationed U.S. nuclear 
– or nuclear-capable – weapons on Taiwanese territory (withdrawn in 1974), Taiwan’s 
sense of security was badly shaken by China’s first nuclear test in October 1964.  
Cables sent to Washington from the U.S. embassy in Taipei reflect the near panic 
(Albright et al. 1998: 55).”  Following those developments, a flurry of activity was set 
off in Taiwan over the next few decades, during the presidencies of both Chiang Kai-
shek and his son who succeeded him upon his death.   
     Just as with the situation in South Korea, the dictatorship on Taiwan was prevented 
from ultimately producing nuclear weapons by its primary benefactor, the United 
States.  The Americans, terrified of the rhetorical and political ramifications of one of 
its major allies in the region outwardly possessing nuclear weapons, definitely used a 
great deal of their international clout to prevent Taiwan from securing nuclear 
weapons.  Much of this was probably due to poor timing for the Taiwanese, given that 
the 1970s saw the United States finally come around to accepting mainland China as 
the actual, true China.  The above article gives an additional useful quote: “By the late 
1980s, according to a U.S. official, the goal was preventing Taiwan from ‘getting even 
close (Albright et al. 1998: 60).’”  The military history of Taiwan is rather impressive, 
given that it seems that there were plenty in Taiwan that knew a great deal about how 
to go about making a nuclear weapon, but cooler heads often prevailed among them.  
It appears that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to have some kind of a major deterrent to use 
against China, but he failed to properly motivate those working for him to come 
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through as far as a nuclear weapon that was built.  The following quote also shows 
how the Americans were able to exact their demands on the Taiwanese: “That Taiwan 
depended on the United States for its security made it possible for Washington to 
intervene repeatedly in Taipei’s nuclear affairs.  Without that ‘unique’ relationship, 
demarches to the head of state would not have been quite so effective (Burr 8/9/07).”  
Once again, the Americans prove to be the most effective tool against the potential 
arms race.  How resilient that would be today if Taiwan were equally motivated to 
build nuclear weapons still is a question.   
     There certainly remains in Taiwan plenty of expertise about how to build a nuclear 
weapon.  It is through sheer concern with political, as well as military, security that 
Taiwan has relented from going further.  Albright and Gay write: “…little hard 
information exists to make a reliable determination of how quickly Taiwan could build 
nuclear weapons.  Although Taiwan never separated very much, if any, plutonium, 
U.S. technical specialists concede that Taiwan learned many important lessons about 
separating plutonium and turning it into metal.  U.S. experts also worry that Taiwan 
learned a great deal about making a nuclear explosive (Albright et al. 1998: 60).”  
What we basically learn from that is that, if the international environment were to be 
altered enough, we would probably end up seeing a Taiwan that was armed with 
nuclear weapons.  The problem for Taiwan strategically with nuclear weapons is that, 
since China would be its primary concern in all likelihood for their potential use, there 
would not be so much a problem of mutually-assured destruction as the assured 
destruction of Taiwan.  Given the obvious size differences between the two states, 
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mainland China could certainly absorb a bevy of nuclear detonations compared to its 
ornery neighbor to the southeast.   
     Alternative viewpoints exist regarding the American reaction to the potential 
development of nuclear weapons by the Taiwanese.  Perhaps it would have been better 
for regional security and the maintenance of the status quo if Taiwan had been left to 
its own self-serving devices: “For decades that island nation has faced the threatening 
prospect of a very hostile takeover by (nuclear-armed) mainland China, and by the late 
1970s the United States was in the process of deciding to reduce its security 
guarantees, which would presumably make Taiwan more vulnerable….the problem is 
that, laboring under the sway of the proliferation fixation, policy toward Taiwan was 
fabricated in a knee-jerk fashion that precluded even the consideration of an obvious, 
and potentially productive, policy alternative (Mueller 2010: 118).”  With that 
quotation, the author seems to argue that the United States at least should have taken 
some more time in analyzing what it would have meant for Taiwan to possess nuclear 
weapons.  Given that, during the 1970s, China was in the throes of dealing with 
decades of Maoist economic mismanagement, the mainland would not have been in a 
real position to do anything about Taiwan developing many different kinds of 
technologies. 
     Threats of a Taiwan nuclear weapons program are also potentially damaging to 
political figures in Taiwan.  For example, the 2008 elections that brought the KMT 
back into power are arguably the result of an accusation thrown at the leader of the 
Democratic Progressive Party by a KMT legislator.  The following quotation describes 
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the dynamic: “…the allegations may have served to heighten fears about (DPP 
President) Chen’s confrontational stance toward China, as well as to remind the 
international community of Taiwan’s latent ability – if not intent – to produce nuclear 
weapons (Dougherty 2/08).”  The beating that the DPP endured in that election after 
such provocative comments speaks to the antipathy that the Taiwanese public has 
toward nuclear weapons, another damper on the potential arms race.   
     Taiwan made the choice between being an economic giant and a military giant.  It 
ultimately chose the economic side of the argument.  Mueller writes: “…why (was 
Taiwan) receptive to American threats? ...it was because (Taiwan) had harnessed 
(itself) to – had put (its) highest priority on – a politically popular economic growth 
strategy that vitally depended on international trade and access.  This made (Taiwan) 
not only susceptible to American blandishments but also wary of doing anything that 
might alienate international institutions or cause concern among commercial partners 
(Mueller 2010: 124).”  There are benefits to both frames of perspective, but I would 
argue that the economic argument might make more sense, given that, even if the 
world were to go up in flames via a nuclear war, at least Taiwan would not be 
burdened with the potential blame of having started the conflict through its blatant 
ignoring of international proliferation law. 
     Taiwan has become one of East Asia’s leaders in civil rights.  Similar to South 
Korea, that occurred after decades of authoritarianism that left the common person in 
those countries perilously underrepresented.  After 2000, in which Taiwan saw its first 
transition in political power away from General Chiang’s KMT (Ho 2003: 683), the 
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new liberal democratic ideals showed their solidification within Taiwanese society 
through the advent of new political demonstrations and protests among much of 
Taiwan’s traditional industries and projects, such as nuclear energy and development 
(Ho 2003).  As has been seen with Japan, for example, it appears that the more 
educated a population is on average, in addition to the number of political and civil 
rights that the average citizen is afforded, the more likely it is that there will be at least 
a substantial proportion of the population that is less hawkish than they would have 
been otherwise.  Now that Taiwan is essentially on American or Western European 
levels of democratic and civic idealism, it would have to take quite a dramatic shift in 
the international arena for it to come out of its anti-nuclear weapons paradigm of the 
current era. 
 
Taiwanese Identity 
     As with South Korea, however, Taiwan has the problem that it is so historically and 
oftentimes genetically and ancestrally tied to the Chinese mainland.  If China becomes 
more aggressive militarily and politically toward Taiwan as its economy continues to 
expand at the most rapid rate seen in recorded history, it will be up to the Taiwanese to 
decide how they want to fit into the mold of China’s evolution, which, like it or not, 
they are a part of, since many of them are basically Chinese themselves.  The problem 
for China, though, when arguing that they should be the beneficiaries of the ultimate 
and hypothetical absorption of Taiwan is that the reason why the Taiwanese are not 
eager to go back to being a part of mainland China is the same reason why the 
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Taiwanese ultimately decided not to proceed any further than they had with their 
nuclear weapons development.  That reason is that with their economic power came 
further international respect and security through forces other than Taiwan’s own 
weaponry.  Rather, it was their popularity.  Once that economic security was 
delivered, the people of Taiwan became more open to making their country more 
prosperous in democratic terms.  Now that the paradigm has also shifted in Taiwan 
away from the constant presence of the KMT (though the KMT is still a major 
political force in Taiwanese politics), a one-party system like that found in mainland 
China is far from appealing to most of the people living on the island.  One could 
easily wonder whether or not China could ever take Taiwan back through the force of 
arms without annihilating the island to an extent that would make it completely 
undesirable.  I certainly find it difficult to believe that the people of Taiwan would be 
willing to surrender before the Chinese mainlanders suffered terrible penalties, in 
addition to the damage that would have to be done to Taiwan itself.  A brief 
description of the technologies that Taiwan is currently working on to address those 
concerns follows: “In April 2007, upon completing its Han Kuang computer war 
games, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry informed the American observers that Taiwan now 
has ‘Tactical Shorebase Missiles for Fire Suppression’ (TSMFS) with a range of up to 
1,000 kilometers.  The Ministry said that TSMFS is a passive system designed to 
counter an attack by China and only target the mainland’s airports and missile 
batteries, not civilian installations…(Wang 2008: 422-423).”  That scenario is not a 
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happy one, but it must be considered when dealing with the prospects of China ever 
taking the island back. 
     Similarly to Japan, the island of Taiwan has not been free of foreign nuclear 
weapons.  The United States, as Taiwan’s primary defender in the decades that 
followed its political separation from the mainland, had its own stockpile on the 
island: “Recently declassified material shows that from January 1958 to July 1974, the 
United States stored nuclear weapons on Taiwan.  U.S. protection prevented a Chinese 
attack on Taiwan (Wang 2008: 409).”  As the guarantors of Taiwanese security, to this 
day, the Taiwanese appear very reluctant to risk showing the Americans any form of 
rebuke or snub.  Therefore, it makes sense that for much of the time that Taiwan was 
recognized by much of the international community, particularly the United States, as 
the legitimate government of China (as the ROC), the United States had free rein to 
bring nuclear weapons to rest on the island. 
     The real pressure for Taiwan in the modern era is that the United States is 
beginning to lose its foothold in certain parts of the world, East Asia being one of 
them, in the military sense, at least.  Given that “the United States is mired in Iraq 
(Wang 2008: 409),” countries such as Taiwan are having to adjust to that reality that 
they are more on their own than they previously have been.  Therefore, only time will 
tell the degree to which the Taiwanese work to appease the mainland Chinese or how 
much the rhetoric is amplified on their side of the Formosa Strait, given the boldness 
that they may likely have, given their large conventional weapon stockpile. 
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Theoretical Implications of the Taiwan Situation      
     As an offshoot via revolutionary war of what has become Asia’s latest economic 
juggernaut, Taiwan’s application to the security model mentioned by Sagan is valid.  
Sagan is correct in the assumption that the model could not be enough to describe the 
dynamics of why Taiwan has not developed the bomb.  The American guarantee with 
Taiwan is probably a little more uncertain than with Japan or South Korea, since 
Taiwan is not universally accepted as its own state.  China’s global dominance in 
many senses requires the Americans holding back at least politically in a way that they 
do not have to with the other two countries under examination.  However, in the era 
when mainland China successfully tested a nuclear bomb, Taiwan was still accepted as 
the entire country’s legitimate government by the United States.  Therefore, its client 
state status remained a little more convincing.  The American deterrent went further 
than it did in the 1970s, when the mainland Chinese and Americans arrived at 
something of a rapprochement.  The nuclear ambitions of Taiwan that went into the 
late 1980s were seen as a natural result of that diplomatic context.  However, as China 
has made its ascendancy into the realm of international responsibility more apparent, 
as will be discussed later, Taiwan’s security excuse has become somewhat more 
shaken.  Still, Taiwan remains a point of contention for mainland China’s Westphalian 
ideology that make it an outlier. 
     The domestic politics model of Sagan’s in regard to Taiwan can be primarily seen 
through the needs of the financial sector.  As a country with limited official access to 
foreign governments, the accumulation of investment capital is critical to the long-
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term survival of the island of Taiwan as the steward landscape of the Republic of 
China government.  With a very low potential for oil and natural gas production (CIA 
2010: Taiwan/Economy) from its own territory, Taiwan requires good international 
relationships for its export-model to stay afloat.  As with almost any democracy, 
domestic politics will rely greatly on the health of the economy, and with the relative 
happiness of investors toward the government currently in power.  As with Japan and 
South Korea, nuclear weapons, particularly in an era like this one with greater 
economic cooperation with mainland China, would disrupt the gains that have been 
made through difficult diplomatic wrangling (particularly difficult in Taiwan’s case 
through its lack of recognition by most of the industrialized world, thanks to the One 
China Policy).  Exports have contributed to 70% of Taiwan’s GDP growth (CIA 2010: 
Taiwan/Economy), causing domestic reverberations via any potential international 
disturbance, most likely ultimately causing an electoral drubbing for any party in 
power at the time that that would happen.  The electoral spat between the two 
presidential opponents in Taiwan, with the perceived support for nuclear weapons 
development existing as a political liability, the domestic context against nuclear 
weapons in Taiwan is fairly clear.  Nuclear weapons will not be supported anytime 
soon, given that “only a minority in Taiwan voice for such a capability (Kondapalli 
2008: 53).”  Only a true warmonger would take the risk, and the reverberations would 
be enormous. 
     The Sagan norms model in reverse regarding proliferation works as well with 
explaining Taiwan’s nuclear weapons aversion of late as it does with Japan or South 
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Korea.  By adhering to the northeast Asian norm of late of rejecting nuclear weapons 
development, Taiwan has added to its international prestige, maintaining sound 
relations and international popularity in spite of a general lack of recognition abroad.  
By contributing as well to the norm primarily fostered by China of keeping East Asia 
peaceful, Taiwan has done its regional duty.  Through the aversion politically to the 
potential for nuclear weapons development in Taiwan, since the dismantling of the 
actual Taiwanese nuclear weapons program, Taiwan and its public’s acceptance of the 
northeast Asian anti-nuclear weapon norm is apparent.     
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5. Existential Threats and Their Nullification      
     The joker card that both South Korea and Taiwan are holding that Japan does not 
that has gone a long way in preventing there from being a nuclear arms race in the 
Asia-Pacific is that their primary adversaries, respectively, cannot help but see an 
inextricable hereditary link with their opponent.  Though South Korea and Taiwan are 
far from weak militarily, even if they were, it would be difficult for either mainland 
China or North Korea to justify overly harsh treatment, much less complete total 
warfare-induced destruction, toward the people of those countries to either the Chinese 
or the North Koreans.  Though the passage of time has probably made many of the 
lingering ties seem fairly remote and distant, and that length of time having made 
these cat-and-mouse games of diplomacy and quasi-warfare seem like blood feuds, the 
main problem with going too far for any of these countries with the nuclear weapons 
issue is that they would unavoidably be destroying a part of themselves, by their own 
definitions.  China claims Taiwan as a part of itself, while North Korea views itself as 
the rightful government of the entire Korean Peninsula.  The fact that the South 
Koreans and Taiwanese are now perfectly capable of defending themselves for at least 
a lengthy amount of time does not change these feelings of familiarity within the two 
dynamics. 
     Japan, in relating to the nuclear arms race or lack thereof in East Asia, is at a bit 
more of a circumstantial disadvantage than South Korea and Taiwan when facing 
threats from a neighbor.  None of Japan’s neighbors feel any particular heritage link 
with Japan, and one of the big problems remaining from Japan’s imperial conquests of 
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over half a century ago at least is that the Japanese themselves made such a huge deal 
out of separating themselves racially from other East Asians.  That racial 
differentiation and championing of the Japanese by the Japanese during World War II 
and before is one of the factors that made Imperial Japan very similar to Nazi 
Germany.  Though the two major Axis powers were very different in some ways, they 
were alike because they had similar ideas about their own respective racial superiority 
relative to those they were fighting or conquering.  In the present day, Japan has no 
one else to turn to along the lines of their similar Japanese-ness or any other 
commonalities along those lines, whereas the Taiwanese are inherently Chinese and 
the South Koreans and North Koreans obviously share a Korean-ness.  They are the 
same people, mostly the same ethnic group.  Therefore, a scene from the 2002 James 
Bond film Die Another Day in which the primary North Korean villain says that 
“Japan is a bug waiting to be squashed (EON Productions 2002)” appears rather 
realistic, given the North Koreans’ feelings toward the Japanese, mainly left over from 
World War II and the occupation period that preceded it.   
     Though American pressure has obviously gone a long way in preventing the 
Japanese, South Koreans, and Taiwanese thus far from procuring their own permanent 
indigenous nuclear weapons stockpiles, it certainly cannot go the whole distance in 
explaining why these countries have been so remarkably abstinent from the nuclear 
fetishism that has afflicted other American allies, where American pressure has 
probably been relatively similar to the experiences of the American allies in the Asia-
Pacific.  Theoretically travel to the other side of Asia, and one will find that the 
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American allies of Israel and Pakistan do indeed possess nuclear weapons, even 
though they are not among the permanent members of the UN Security Council that 
are seen as the rightful and lawful owners of nuclear weapons. 
     Israel was created in 1948 as an explicitly Jewish state as a way for much of the 
world to try to make amends for the Holocaust by Nazi Germany.  Given the explicit 
religious preference of the mandate that enabled Israel to justify itself to anyone, Israel 
became immediately politically separate from the primarily Arab countries that 
surrounded it, in both constitution and the general feeling.  Also given the many 
international problems that placing a Jewish state in the heart of the Middle East in 
1948 brought, the United States was somewhat more prevented in setting up too much 
of an obvious military presence in Israel than it was with Japan, which it had taken 
over following a large military conflict.  Many of Israel’s neighbors over the course of 
the past several decades have been even more explicit than some of Japan’s traditional 
regional rivals in calling for Israel’s total annihilation.  Therefore, the nuclear weapons 
program that Israel has semi-covertly developed is more politically feasible for the 
Israelis than it ever could have been so far for the Japanese. 
     The nuclear weapons program of Pakistan contributed to much of the late 1990s 
nuclear nightmare, given that it occurred relatively soon after India became more 
brash about its own nuclear program.  Similar to Israel, Pakistan’s very existence as a 
separate state from the old British India is inherently rooted in its particular religious 
identity.  Since in 1947 the Islamic and Hindu leaders of India decided that their 
peoples could not be counted on to coexist peacefully as fellow citizens, India and 
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Pakistan became split, but from much the same cloth.  That has not prevented a great 
number of wars between the two countries since that time.   
     The religious elements at play in both the cases of Israel and Pakistan appear very 
much to differentiate the scenarios from those found in East Asia, even with Japan, 
because the financial element in East Asia seems to have overtaken almost everything 
else.  Rather than risk certain valuable financial and business enterprises, the countries 
of East Asia, for the most part, have relented in their previous drives to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  The costs involved in going any further with nuclear weapons development 
would be too painful to their bottom line.  In Western Asia, those same business 
ventures were rendered impossible by religious hatred, so they were never as much of 
a factor.  
 
China and Military Restraint      
     One of the countries in East Asia that has probably had the most to do with 
preventing a nuclear arms race from spiraling out of control in the region has been the 
People’s Republic of China.  One could certainly take issue with a number of Chinese 
foreign policy decisions since the inception of the current Chinese government in 
1949, but being overly brash with its nuclear weapons since it first tested a nuclear 
bomb in 1964 has not been one of the sins perpetrated by the one-party state.  Though 
China has often invited fear in its direction with certain potentially interpreted 
transgressions like its overtures toward its perceived rightful ownership of the island 
of Taiwan, it also does not take too much of an education regarding East Asian politics 
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to see how different decisions by the Communist semi-superpower of the region could 
have led to much more deadly disasters than there have been.  Indeed, I would argue 
that much of the paranoia related to China comes from the formerly more openly 
imperialist powers that were responsible for so many of the ills that China suffered 
during the 19th and first half of the 20th century.  To that point, Arpit Rajain writes: 
“Post 1949, there was a deep sense of vulnerability that pervaded Chinese thinking on 
security matters, which can be traced to the Chinese experience at the hands of 
Western nations and Japan in the 18th century.  China in general, and Chinese strategic 
culture more specifically, was deeply affected by its experiences with almost all 
imperialist powers through the 19th and 20th centuries (Rajain 2005: 99).”  Therefore, 
it is natural that countries like the former colonial powers in Western Europe, the 
United States, and Japan would not be terribly pleased with an assertive, economically 
aggressive, and militarily confident new China.  That is nearly what we have arrived at 
in 2010. 
     Having destroyed much of Eastern China or exploited it during World War II, the 
Japanese would have had a great deal to fear from a China that was more keen on 
remembering in detail those past atrocities.  Probably part of what has allowed Japan 
to abstain from developing nuclear weapons, or from being more insistent to the 
Americans for the diplomatic permission to proceed any further with such programs, 
has been the existence of a mainland China that, while certainly politically distinct 
from many of the brazenly capitalist countries that surround it (Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.), has appeared to be far more focused on financial 
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expansion since the death of Chairman Mao than on seeking military revenge for the 
wrongs that were committed against it during times of open warfare.  Japan and 
mainland China are economically interconnected to a degree that many probably 
would have seen as impossible in the years following World War II.  China becoming 
ever more low-key toward Japan in the years since the United States has minimized its 
military footprint in Japan has certainly given a big boost to the anti-nuclear 
persuasion in the political circles of Japan.  A more rhetorically aggressive China 
would benefit the hawks in Japan that wished to develop an indigenous system of 
nuclear weaponry. 
     A less offensively-oriented China has also benefited those in South Korea who do 
not wish to begin a South Korean nuclear weapons program.  Though the South 
Koreans never perpetrated actions toward the Chinese like the Japanese did, the South 
Koreans and Chinese nonetheless were on opposing sides of the Korean War.  That 
potentially rigorous history has been overcome, however, by a fairly mutually 
beneficial economic relationship.  This has risked further isolation for North Korea, 
which, without China, could certainly plausibly have faded into historical-only status 
as a country without the assistance of mainland China. 
     One of the factors that has contributed to a more positive relationship between 
China and Japan over the last few years has been Japan’s realization that times are 
changing to the extent where Japan is likely to no longer be the world’s second largest 
economy within a very short period of time.  Even the relatively hawkish and pro-
revisionist, short-lived Shinzo Abe government in Japan took aim at improving 
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relations with China: “(The 2006 visit to China by Shinzo Abe) resulted in a pledge to 
move forward in China-Japan strategic relations and triggered a series of cooperative 
gestures aimed at declaring a new era of cooperation on North Korea, intellectual 
property rights, energy development, and the environment (Zhao 2009: 136).”  Abe 
was quoted as saying that Japan “must build future-oriented and stable Japan-China 
relations,” highlighting how Japan is forced to kow-tow to China to an extent 
simultaneously with trying to maintain a degree of its honor, given that it has not fully 
apologized for the events that occurred between the two countries during World War 
II.   
     Abe’s predecessor in the Japanese prime ministerial position, Junichiro Koizumi, 
frequently invited rebuke from the East Asian region for his numerous visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine where many convicted war criminals from Japan’s 
imperial period have been turned into gods.  Koizumi being no fool, he was well 
aware of the reaction that such visits would inspire, so it was a way for Japan to 
maintain some of its old ways of ignoring the damage that it had wrought on Asia 
during World War II, while at the same time Japan was having to adjust to a new 
China-centric Asia.  Japan certainly remains a great distance away from the sort of 
Willy Brandt gesture in Warsaw during the 1970s, where the German chancellor got 
on his knees and begged for forgiveness for what Nazi Germany had committed 
around Europe during World War II. 
     As has already been mentioned in this thesis, North Korea’s rash and unpredictably 
wild behavior in relation to the international community has caused there to be a 
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definite rift between North Korea and communist China.  There can be no denial of 
the fact that that rift has been caused by China’s disappointment at its ally presenting 
such an idiosyncratic and chaotic problem.  In order to define and frame why China 
might be experiencing such anger toward North Korea, besides the thankless attitude 
the North Koreans have shown toward the Chinese for their national survival, Yufan 
Hao puts it very well: “China needs a fairly long period of peace to develop its 
economy, solve its social problems, upgrade its industrial and defense capacity, and 
become strong enough to defend itself from external threats.  For these purposes, 
Beijing needs to maintain internal political stability and harmony and a peaceful 
external environment (Hao 2009: 160).”  What North Korea has been doing for 
practically its entire existence has contributed to the undermining of those goals for 
China.  Following the reforms led by Deng in China after Mao’s death, China has been 
working essentially 100% towards its big money aspirations, which is much of my 
answer to why there has not been an East Asian nuclear arms race.  The coveting by 
the Chinese government of its dreams of financial supremacy have actually 
contributed, perhaps ironically, in the long run to a more peaceful East Asian regional 
environment.   
     With the exception of North Korea, China’s security concerns toward other 
countries in the region (perhaps that is also ironic, since North Korea is its de jure ally) 
are fairly minimal at the moment.  The United States, still the world’s only 
superpower, remains both a major economic partner for China and a political 
opponent.  China’s dreadful human rights record provides the United States with 
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plenty of rhetorical ammunition, while the number of American treasury bonds 
possessed by the Chinese make it practically impossible for the Americans to do 
anything about it.  However, the continued global supremacy of the United States 
military makes it second to none, even though it is seriously overstretched.  The 
alliances maintained by the United States toward Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
have helped to define for China what it is to make of those three players that this thesis 
has focused so intensively on.  Additionally, since China’s armed forces would be no 
match for the Americans’ in the event of a hypothetical conventional conflict, China 
has had to find other routes toward regional supremacy, which is what was discussed 
in the preceding paragraphs, primarily that of economic craftiness.  In that game, it is 
difficult to see how the Chinese have at least not played the Americans to at least a 
draw, if not an outright victory at the moment.  Partly to this point, Chu Shulong and 
Rong Yu write: “Although China can devote increasing resources, it is unlikely to 
develop a large nuclear arsenal to compete with the United States or to dramatically 
alter its nuclear strategy.  That would undermine its strategy of peaceful rise.  Beijing 
does not seek to become a strong world military power on par with the United States 
(Chu et al. 2008: 161).”  That point that China has made of not becoming overly 
ostentatious with its potential military power and its refusal to try to meet the United 
States militarily on its own terms has led in the long run to the global community 
having greater respect for China.  It is historically impressive, given that China has as 
much right to bitterness as any country toward the former imperial powers, but it has 
caused a paradigm shift by not displaying too much rage. 
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     China has also been granted great leverage in the global community with it being 
the only Asia-Pacific country on the United Nations Security Council.  Russia is 
technically on the Asian Pacific coastline, but it is hard to see how the Moscow 
government is not more regionally aligned with Europe.  With its security council seat, 
China has an almost unique role in being able to set the tone of rightful military 
enforcement.  As a legal nuclear weapon possessor, China is also in a unique situation 
for East Asia.  However, by not throwing too much of its weight around since its 
meteoric rise following the post-Mao reforms, China has also gained a fair deal of at 
least economic trust. 
     One issue that creates an unusual reaction from the Chinese government and its 
people is that of the Taiwan question.  Given that the Chinese view Taiwan as their 
rightful possession and territory, temperatures run rather high when the subject is 
broached.  The existence of Taiwan as a separate entity from the mainland, when it 
was previously an obvious historical possession, has created a continuously awkward 
situation not just for the two governments that border the Formosa Strait, but also for 
the relationship between the United States and mainland China.  Zhidong Hao writes: 
“One thing is unlikely to change: China will not tolerate Taiwan’s independence and is 
prepared to go to war if necessary.  This is true not only because of Taiwan’s strategic 
location but also because of Chinese nationalism (Hao 2009: 202).”  Therefore, we 
have arrived at an example of Chinese nationalism continuing to bring the past into 
current de facto international relations, differently from China’s current relations with 
Japan and South Korea, for the most part.  The split between the mainland and Taiwan 
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occurred in 1949, so most people in either place were not born during that time.  Hao 
also includes an important quote from the American Department of Defense related to 
the Taiwan issue for the mainland Chinese: “Many Chinese strategists and analysts 
view Taiwan as occupying a critical geostrategic location whose control would enable 
the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy to move its maritime defensive perimeter 
further seaward and improve Beijing’s ability to influence regional sea lines of 
communication.  Alternatively, according to some observers, permanent separation of 
Taiwan from the mainland would constrain China’s ability to project power and 
provide the United States with a strategic foothold adjacent (to) China’s coastal 
economic centers (Hao 2009: 202-203).”  Again, we have an example where perhaps 
China’s apparent emotional response to the island of Taiwan and its semi-separatist 
government is rooted in potentially pragmatic ideas.  Given that mainland China does 
indeed have a fairly legitimate claim to the island, since the Chinese Communist Party 
is now acknowledged by the international community to be the rightful governing 
entity of China itself, Taiwan is in essence a part of China because it always had been 
until the split during the civil war. 
     The point in discussing this is that Taiwan represents the rare occasion where 
Chinese pragmatism is at least threatened through an emotional issue for much of 
China’s citizenry.  The public discourse in mainland China about Taiwan is rooted in 
nationalism, and therefore an attitude of taking back Taiwan at all costs, such as a 
potential military confrontation with the United States, China’s superior in terms of 
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firepower, creates the kind of situation where China’s possession of nuclear weapons 
starts to look a bit more dangerous. 
     Chinese emotions related to the issue of Taiwan are perhaps some of the main 
contributing factors to the American authorities being particularly terrified of Taiwan 
and the ROC government acquiring nuclear weapons.  If Taiwan were to take such 
drastic measures to ensure its own security against a government that has the 
recognition of most of the global community as the one and only China, the situation 
could get very ugly very quickly.  Additionally, as has been mentioned previously in 
this paper, the very fact that China asserts its sovereignty over Taiwan in terms of the 
discourse protects Taiwan from the risk of Chinese nuclear attack, even with the 
mainland Chinese nationalism appearing heated and dangerous.  The Taiwanese will 
have to tread lightly in the coming years as American power is inevitably waning, in 
order that Chinese pragmatism will continue to triumph over the lesser parts of their 
national character, so that the Taiwanese can use the better parts of the Chinese to 
ensure their continued protection from excessive aggression.  However, it is likely that 
many factors will have to shift in Chinese domestic politics in order for the Taiwanese, 
who have grown accustomed to democracy and other kinds of lifestyle choices, to 
accept being absorbed back into the Chinese system. 
     Following the detonation of China’s first atomic bomb in 1964, Chinese officials 
stated that the mainland would follow a strict no-first-use policy.  The defensive 
nature from the outset of the stated goals of China’s nuclear weapons program 
obviously continue to be somewhat reassuring, given that even more dangerous would 
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be a country that was bold in its statements as well as in its actions.  However, in 
2005, when a PLA general stated that China should use nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
in the case of American intervention during a hypothetical future Chinese invasion of 
Taiwan (Zhang 2008: 164), panic, at least in some circles, ensued.  The no-first-use 
policy that had been in action for over forty years was thrown into question.  
Fortunately, the Chinese have not yet had a chance to show us one way or the other.   
     Still, the general’s comments reflect what has already been stated here, and the 
main reason for China being as much of a nuclear weapons holder as it is: China is no 
match whatsoever for the United States in terms of conventional weapons, and the 
United States continues to reaffirm its commitment to the security of a sovereign 
Taiwan in a very open way via its arms deals.  Zhang writes: “There are indeed strong 
incentives for China to consider such a change due to both its inability to overcome 
the vast conventional gap with the United States and the current modernization of 
Chinese strategic nuclear forces that will for the first time provide a secure second-
strike capability (Zhang 2008: 170).”  In a sense, the Chinese appear with these 
provocative and controversial statements to be attempting to call the Americans’ bluff.  
How far will the United States go to protect Taiwan’s current political status? 
     The answer appears to be pretty far, according to relatively recent history.  In 1995 
and 1996, the United States dispatched several ships to the Formosa Strait in response 
to China’s provocative military maneuvers timed closely to Taiwanese elections, a 
signal of approaching independence declarations.  Robert Ross writes: “On March 4 
(1996) China announced that the PLA would conduct surface-to-surface missile tests 
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from March 8 to March 18.  The target areas were waters just off the coast of 
Taiwan’s two largest port cities, one of which was barely twenty miles from the 
northern port of Keelung….On March 7, despite vigorous and repeated discussions 
between U.S. and Chinese diplomats and U.S. advice that China not proceed with its 
missile tests, the PLA fired three M-9 missiles into target zones (Ross 2003: 243).”  
However, given that no actual conflict came from such an incident, it is difficult to say 
to what extent it signals the American commitment at present.  The Chinese were not 
in a position to really attack Taiwan, and they still are not, assuming they will not lose 
all sanity and try to use the nuclear option.  Additionally, the United States has lost a 
great deal of its leverage toward China in the last 14 years or so since the Taiwan 
Strait incidents of that period during the Clinton Administration.  Even then, the 
Chinese were willing to challenge the United States, or at least prod them into some 
kind of a reaction.  Therefore, it makes sense that in recent years, the United States has 
tried much harder to foster a more cooperative and harmonious relationship across the 
Taiwan Strait. 
     China’s relationship with South Korea since the de facto end of the Korean War in 
1953 is a relatively brief history.  Ren Xiao points out how the end of the Cold War 
brought many changes to East Asia, as it did to all parts of the world.  China and 
South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, which contributed to even 
greater international isolation of North Korea (Ren 2007: 146-147).  Such a move by 
China asserted its willingness to join the free world, to an extent, at least for the 
purpose of pursuing further commercial opportunities (which actually strongly aligns 
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mainland China with the goals of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan).  North Korea 
being an economic flop since the end of authoritarian rule in South Korea, it has 
become less interesting for China even in that way to maintain it as a key ally.  China 
being willing to recognize South Korea as a legitimate state showed how China, as a 
mature country, was willing to put a conflict behind it in order for the region to move 
forward. 
     In its recent relationships with the countries that have been the primary objects of 
discussion so far in this paper, China has shown how pragmatism and the requirements 
of good business decisions and goals have pushed China to be a relatively responsible 
regional owner of nuclear weapons and their corresponding technologies.  China’s 
business drive has also accelerated its general policy of promoting peace and stability 
in the surrounding region.  After all, good business is difficult to compose in warring 
territories.  Chaos is not in China’s best interest in achieving those aims.  Also 
highlighted by that drive toward the promotion of harmony in East Asia is the fact that 
China has shown its willingness to sacrifice many aspects of its often archaic 
relationship with North Korea.  Given that North Korea is not a promoter of peace in 
East Asia, China should naturally split with it over a great many things.  What support 
left for North Korea that China maintains appears to be manifested out of pure self-
interest.  China left no evidence that it was pleased with North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development accomplishments of recent years.  Greed among the upper 
echelons of China’s military-industrial complex seems to be the main cause of China’s 
drives toward peace in the region, and the corresponding lack of an arms race initiated 
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by Chinese maneuvers.  Though that greed comes with its own set of problems, it is 
rendered a relatively moot point in a security analysis.  Whatever is required to 
minimize the risk of mass destruction and suffering is worth a great deal.  China 
appears to be performing fairly well in its role to at least discourage nuclear weapons 
development in the Asia-Pacific region. 
     With all due credit to China for its reasonable efforts at keeping nuclear weapons 
development at relative bay in the Asia-Pacific, it has not been a perfect angel in that 
regard.  On part of China’s southern border is India, the country with the population 
size that is second only to China’s in the world, and with an economy that is 
expanding nearly as quickly as China’s.  China and India also share a somewhat shaky 
history of their relations.  Given the tenuousness of the relationship between China 
and India, China may occasionally seek methods of distraction for India, or 
containment programs.  China’s adherence to the nonproliferation treaty that it is a 
signatory of has been thrown into question by China’s nuclear technology transfers to 
Pakistan, the traditional enemy of India since their simultaneous independence from 
Great Britain in 1947.  For discontinuities in China’s apparent nuclear technology 
policies, T.V. Paul explains it with the following statement, at least in part: “…China 
is reluctant to see any other states in East Asia acquire nuclear arms.  Here, China 
seems to make a distinction between its immediate or most strategically vital region 
and less vital regions.  South Asia and the Middle East are less vital to China than is 
East Asia (Paul 2005: 177).”  With the mismatches in policy of China’s nuclear 
technologies from region to region, we can start to see the way that China views East 
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Asia, the region nearest to China’s major cities, primarily the cities that house the 
majority of China’s government buildings and major industries.  Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou, to name a few, are all in the eastern sector of the country, and are 
some of the centers of China’s majority Han population.  Therefore, we get something 
of an ethnic aspect, potentially, to China’s maintenance of an anti-nuclear weapons 
policy in East Asia, rather than in South Asia. 
     Through its Pakistan weapons policy, China shows that its interests in the 
maintenance of peace have their limits.  Still, it shows that the Chinese government 
believes that China is a member of the community of nations in East Asia due to the 
fact that a more peaceful environment in East Asia means good business in China, 
while a potential disaster in South Asia is less drastic in that regard.  However, within 
East Asia, China still seems to regard itself as a true representative of the community.  
The following is an excerpt describing a wing of thought in Chinese nationalist 
philosophy: “Sinocentrism, which seems to have remained extant in the guise of 
Chinese Communism, is historically grounded in Chinese thought as part of a 
cosmology that places China at the center of the universe, not as a nation-state in 
geopolitics but as a civilization state in geomoral politics (Kim et al. 2008).”  Perhaps 
that also works to explain why China places such an emphasis on East Asia in its 
weapons of mass destruction policies, since the centerpieces of the Han people of the 
Chinese civilization are based in what many would understand to be East Asia, rather 
than the Western Asia that other parts of China could be seen to occupy. 
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     All potential accusation of Chinese ethnocentricity and nationalism aside, some 
would argue that China is a part of an Asian power balance and understands it at the 
same time.  If this balance of power were something that was continually both sought 
and guarded, it could mean good things for security in the region, primarily through 
the enforced and voluntary limitations on nuclear weapons possession.  Jitsuo 
Tsuchiyama uses a quotation from Kenneth Waltz in his article “The US-Japan 
Alliance in Focus: “the actions and reactions of China, Japan, and South Korea, with 
or without American participation, are creating a new balance of power in East Asia, 
which is becoming part of the new balance of power in the world (Tsuchiyama 2008: 
135).”  Even as China is growing at a dramatic rate economically and in terms of its 
global political power as a result of its economic status (that itself being the result of 
deft economic strategy on the part of Chinese policymakers), it will inevitably be in a 
far different situation from the United States at the end of World War II (which saw 
the United States as the only great power that was relatively untouched).  Even as it 
becomes the region’s #1, China will be very near to at least a few countries that have 
the economic capability to make their voices heard.  The United States was never in 
that position.  So, even as American influence in the region wanes (as it is almost sure 
to), China will have many other Asian voices to contend with, perhaps attracting some 
bitterness in the process. 
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Non-Military Necessities      
     Due to the shared nature and responsibility of Northeast Asian security that are 
understood among the more emotionally mature leaderships of the nations that we 
have been discussing, nuclear weapons development can be halted through the 
continued stabilization of the region through mutually beneficial economic alliances 
and partnerships.  T.J. Pempel writes: “…Chinese and Taiwanese accession to the 
WTO early in 2002, combined with the unmistakable dependency on non-Asian 
markets by virtually all the major exporting countries of Asia, make it improbable that 
the region is working towards, or would want to work towards, regional isolation or 
autarky as a viable long-term strategy (Pempel 2008: 257-258).”  Within that excerpt 
lies much of the point that has been made in this paper, which is also the distinction 
between North Korea and the other nations discussed.  Embarking on a path of greater 
nuclear weapons ability has come with the promise of a much darker future for those 
countries that would step in that cesspool.  China is the exception, since it developed 
nuclear weapons technology relatively early, has a UN Security Council seat, and is 
one of the accepted nuclear weapons-holding nations of the NPT.  Since the expansion 
of wealth has been so thoroughly championed in East Asia, generally a globally 
competitive region, nuclear weapons accumulation has not been a well-received notion 
there.  Joining global institutions such as the WTO that advocate policies generally 
favorable toward capitalistic ideas is a much more likely and acceptable track for such 
countries. 
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     A particularly fascinating development for Japan, South Korea, and China has been 
their acceptance into the ASEAN+3 arrangement.  The conspicuous exclusion of 
North Korea and Taiwan from the ASEAN community speaks to the timidities that 
still exist in the region (for very different reasons) toward those governments.  
However, the “+3” group have come to some interesting conclusions since their 
membership.  Cesar de Prado writes: “While there is no public discussion about 
enacting a bold policy though which all people could freely travel, work and settle in 
Northeast Asia, the governments of Japan, mainland China and South Korea are 
nevertheless softly weaving bilateral ‘people’s exchanges’ into a more tripartite or 
trilateral regional space (de Prado 2008: 316).”  The efforts that are remarked on 
involve various cultural and personnel exchanges among those countries that are 
meant to encourage the understanding of a more coherent Northeast Asian community, 
the lack thereof which has led to many disagreements and fights in the past.  Such 
attempts at reconciliation and more enlightened viewpoints are perhaps the single best 
method of opposing greater nuclear weapons proliferation, and also something that has 
helped limit the probability of a new East Asian nuclear arms race. 
     Something that can be interpreted both as a benefit and a danger to the continued 
security, particularly in terms of limiting nuclear weapons development, of northeast 
Asia is the relentlessly Westphalian notion of sovereignty that is so revered among 
Chinese policymakers.  Chinese insistence on maintaining the sovereignty of foreign 
governments has given other countries troubles in trying to unravel developments like 
the North Korean missile tests.  However, China is not easily accused of attempting to 
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unduly influence too many other countries (another perhaps deft policy maneuver on 
the part of the Chinese).  Having not gotten directly engaged in a foreign conflict since 
the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, China also maintains a fair degree of credibility as 
a militarily peaceful county, at least as far as the internationally-related nature of the 
Chinese military. 
     With China’s tremendous economic vitality to the global community, its input, 
when given, is a valued commodity to other policymakers in international institutions.  
However, China’s reluctance to become too involved in the affairs of other nations can 
cause some trouble for others.  Seiichiro Takagi writes: “…China’s adamant 
adherence to the notion of sovereignty and the norm of non-interference in domestic 
affairs has constituted an almost insurmountable obstacle to institutional development 
of some regional security mechanisms.  The most telling case, of course, is China’s 
attempts to stall the development of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) (as a security 
mechanism)… (Takagi 2008: 179).”  The United States also used to be more of an 
isolationist and internationally reluctant power than it is in the modern era.  Examples 
highlighting that fact are the durations of time that it took for the United States to join 
the Allied sides of both World War I and World War II.  The largest conflicts in 
history had been going on for years before the United States joined, and in the case of 
World War II, it still took the Axis Powers declaring war on the United States first to 
get the Americans truly and totally involved.  The mainland Chinese might still be 
undergoing a similar adjustment period.  Still relatively unaccustomed to being looked 
to for international guidance and the authorization of certain international policies, the 
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Chinese might not want to be so much in the spotlight.  If that is the case, the Chinese 
have a problem in that they are certainly seen as a fairly responsible member of the 
nuclear weapons-holding community.  With that invaluable credential in their 
metaphorical resume, the mainland Chinese have nothing to look forward to but 
further pressure to grant their opinions on the domestic policies of countries such as 
North Korea and other nations that would attempt to develop their own nuclear 
weapons. 
     To conclude, there are several different explanations for why Northeast Asia 
managed fairly successfully to avoid a nuclear arms race.  American intervention and 
promises of protection were a large factor, but as can be seen in the Middle East, that 
cannot explain everything.  Especially in the modern era, where American hegemony 
is slipping, other solutions must be sought if the region is to remain as nuclear-
weapons-free as it is.  There have to be other incentives available to stay on track for 
peace3. 
     The argument that I make throughout this paper for the nuclear-free nature of the 
East Asia region, generally, is similar to an argument made by Etel Solingen where the 
author attempts to explain how East Asia has become so free of violence compared to 
the Middle East since the end of the Vietnam War.  I basically have tried to add the 
nuclear weapons angle.  Solingen writes: “Export-oriented models in East Asia 
improved conditions for democratization and incentives for external cooperation and 
stability, pivotal ingredients for economic growth, foreign investment, and electoral 
                                                          
3
 Such as financial compensation in some way for compliance, or regional reputational rewards. 
117 
 
viability….East Asian models alleviated tensions, tamed militarization, and enhanced 
cooperation and mutual respect for sovereignty (Solingen 2007: 774).”  Not only does 
that quote help to explain how Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan ultimately stayed 
away from nuclear weapons, but how North Korea can be so shunned as an outlier. 
     The developmental state idea also mentioned by Solingen in her paper is an 
important trait that this paper has carried throughout most of the work, though it has 
not been explicitly mentioned.  Though I firmly believe that there is a large degree of 
economic liberalism (if not neoliberalism) involved in the reasons for these countries 
staying away from the temptation of the possession of nuclear weapons, the 
developmental state idea that is very present in much of the literature on East Asian 
economic development, or “miracles,” can tell us a great deal about the priorities of 
these governments.  Such priorities did not necessarily fall in line with creating 
nuclear armaments.  The developmental state framework involves a high level of 
governmental involvement in the economy.  Where the United States government, for 
example, has generally played a role of late in enforcing (sometimes to a degree 
leaving something to be desired) the assumed rules of the game in economic matters, 
East Asian developmental states like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan created the rules 
of the game for their economies. 
     The military angle of the developmental state is directly related to the general 
security dynamic that the developmental states’ leaders in East Asia endeavored to 
bring their nations toward.  Solingen writes: “East Asian leaders vigilantly steered 
states into macroeconomic stability and proper conditions for sustained export-led 
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growth.  States thus developed into relatively supple, agile mechanisms connecting the 
domestic and global economies (Solingen 2007: 769).”  It is difficult to deny that the 
incorporation of domestically produced and owned nuclear weapons would have 
thrown all of that into disarray.  The fairly Confucian harmonization sought by many 
of the East Asian economies played well into the current dynamic of only China being 
a legitimate possessor of nuclear weapons in the region, with North Korea being the 
lone outlier against the respected paradigm.  Referring again to East Asia’s 
developmental state economic successes, Solingen writes: “Export-led growth stymied 
demands for expansive military-industrial complexes or, at the very least, enabled 
compensatory transfers to the military….  The model’s success yielded more resources 
for military modernization without risking mainstay economic objectives or imposing 
Draconian guns-versus-butter tradeoffs (Solingen 2007: 770).”  In her discussion of 
the East Asian success of governmental interference in the economy, Solingen shows 
us how the resource scarcity made it imperative for the governments to advocate 
intensive participation with other countries on economic grounds.  Overtures and 
posturing along the lines of nuclear weapons development would have been the final 
nail in the coffin for the expansion of these economies into international territory.  
Solingen also mentions how education and technical expertise were used by the 
northeast Asian governments to perpetuate their involvement in the global economy.  
Additionally, we are provided with important figures that show how even during the 
heights of existential threats to countries like South Korea and Taiwan, military 
expenditures declined from the 1960s to the 2000s (Solingen 2007: 770).  Contrary to 
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some opinions that might equate governmental involvement in the economy as some 
form of socialism or communistic totalitarianism, the East Asian version of the 
developmental state regime showed how the governments were more than willing to 
favor winners over losers in the private sector.  The private sector was not an object 
with which the government viewed with hostility, either.  The public and private 
sectors were very close allies. 
     An important factor in the success of the developmental state model appears to be 
the relative absence of domestically harvested natural resources.  This again connects 
the developmental state model to a general part of my theory, which is that Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan lack the resources needed to undertake a hypothetical state 
of autarky.  David Levi-Faur writes: “…all three are poor in natural resources and, 
thus, need to import most of their energy and raw materials (Levi-Faur 1998: 68).”  
That statement is in a comparison of Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan, all cases of the 
developmental state model.  Levi-Faur also discusses how in these developmental 
state examples, the banks controlled the financial systems (Levi-Faur 1998: 71).  The 
banks were controlled by the government.  Therefore, the government was able to 
maintain almost complete autonomy and control over the capital inflows and outflows 
from their nations.  By that token, if one accepts it, then the governments themselves 
become vulnerable to the potentially fickle nature of the international market.  If these 
governments were to do something that was interpreted by global society or, perhaps 
most importantly, investors as stupid, they would be in a great deal of not just 
political, but also financial, trouble.  The developmental state paid off for these three 
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northeast Asian economies examined in financial terms, but it had the reverse effect 
on their potential to have nuclear weapons for as long as that paradigm lasted (which it 
still does, I would argue).   
     In my opinion, in the developmental state model, which I think is actually fairly 
closely aligned with the liberalist argument made by Sagan in his domestic politics 
model, the government acts as something of the majority shareholder the way that 
would be the case in any corporation.  In the developmental state case, however, the 
corporation is the nation, or the economy of the nation.  Hugo Radice writes:  
 
“At the heart of the DS (developmental state) thesis is the relationship between the 
state and the business sector, especially with regard to the direction and funding of 
industrial investment.  In contrast to the conventionally polar models of liberal free-
market capitalism and the state-socialist planned economy, the DS is seen as a 
distinctive political economy that combines elements of market and plan, linking a 
mixed economy to a political-ideological approach that combines authoritarian 
technocracy with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth.  It is also 
assumed that development means industrialization and urbanization, following a path 
laid down by earlier successful developers (Radice 2008: 1154).”     
      
One of the ways that we can understand such a thorough yet far-reaching statement 
regarding the developmental state in terms of the northeast Asian cases is by 
understand how, at least in my opinion, such an undertaking is mutually exclusive 
with nuclear weapons development in this particular region.  North Korea can serve as 
proof of this from its outlier position.  The success of the developmental state, 
regardless of what kind of government runs it (in the cases of at least South Korea and 
Taiwan for a while, the authoritarian variety), hinges on its international financial 
diplomacy.  North Korea, essentially shunning such a maneuver, does not qualify as 
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an example of a developmental state not just because it has failed to make any 
meaningful provisions for its own citizenry, but has also failed to make any successful 
diplomatic overtures of any kind recently.  Nuclear weapons development over the 
entire course of their creation is merely symptomatic of North Korea’s own 
developmental state disqualification. 
     The pro-market ideology inherent in some ways to the developmental state model 
is also critical in understanding how that model laid to rest the notion of developing 
nuclear weapons, if only barely, in the developed nations of northeast Asia.  There is a 
belief in the sanctity of the market within the developmental state process, but it adds 
an element of control that is sorely lacking from most truly laissez faire 
methodologies.  Arvid Lukauskas writes the following about Japan and South Korea: 
“…their financial policy, although interventionist, was designed in ways that still 
submitted private and public financial actors to market discipline (Lukauskas 2002: 
398).”  Within the developmental state model, greed still rules to an extent because the 
government involved, albeit a public actor, does not explicitly favor one sector over 
the other, even its own.  While bold corporatist decisions are perhaps favored for the 
potential gains that they may reap, the public sector leaves itself hamstrung in terms of 
the development of its own nuclear weapons because it introduces a very unstable 
element to a critical situation.  The government in the developmental state model 
creates a situation of intentional vulnerability to global market forces because of the 
rewards that are possible financially within that model.  By the same token, the 
government is free to favor the winners and losers of the market.  Nuclear weapons, 
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before their development, were some of the losers of this equation.  That equation may 
also be a point of contention with my overall thesis.  Oftentimes throughout this paper, 
I have described the nuclear programs in particularly South Korea and Taiwan as 
being tenuously close to completion.  The developmental state model seems to posit 
that nuclear weapons development of any kind (being a natural part of the hypothetical 
military-industrial complex of a country) would be off the table even under the most 
heavy-handed of the regimes led by Synghman Rhee, Park Chung-Hee, or Chiang 
Kai-Shek.  However, given the history, the calls appear to be much too close to make 
such a claim, in my view.  Further study would be warranted. 
     The social networks created in these northeast Asian societies through the 
developmental state model could also be looked at as an alternative explanation for the 
norms that have been created against nuclear weapons development, even as these 
authoritarian developmental states turned into full-fledged democracies.  Because of 
how embedded such states become in the everyday lives of their citizenries, their anti-
nuclear weapons methods as far as the market has been concerned have arguably 
become embedded in the psyches of the populace.  Yoshimatsu Hidetaka writes: “In 
particular, the states work closely with sectors and trade associations to promote rapid 
industrialization.  The intimate relationship facilitates information sharing for 
economic management and sectoral development, and guides capital channeling into 
favored industries (Hidetaka 2003: 104).”  With the favorable employment levels 
generally seen in northeast Asian developmental states, oftentimes those 
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representatives within the associations are grateful for the methods carried on by the 
state, in spite of the authoritarianism that has been involved. 
     The developmental state concept might be seen as so wholly a part of the northeast 
Asian governmental schema that separating it from any other major policy, such as 
nuclear weapons development, would be foolish.  The governments of northeast Asia 
are all rather strong.  Japan appears to be the most hands-off, which only speaks to the 
strength carried by all of them, since it is still heavily involved.  The Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 was originally thought to be the death knell of the developmental state 
in the region, since it was partially the eruption brought about by the rampant 
cronyism that the model had inspired.  Additionally, the relatively recent 
democratizations of some of these East Asian developmental states could easily have 
been assumed to have cast away the model during the recovery process.  However, 
according to some authors, the developmental state came back equal to what it had 
been before, and was instrumental in the recovery process that was fairly speedy 
compared to the initial estimates.  Of South Korea, Thomas Kalinowski writes: 
“Exports were crucial for the recovery by helping accumulate foreign currency 
reserves, but this cannot explain the restabilization of banks and financial markets.  
Here, the strong state, the second ‘traditional strength’ of the Korean developmental 
model, allowed the government to intervene directly in the financial markets in order 
to refinance and restructure the financial sector, as well as to socialize the costs of the 
crisis, unlike many other developing countries (Kalinowski 2008: 449).”  Having been 
shaken so abruptly by the financial crisis, these developmental states had a 
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responsibility to intervene where the private sector (with too much public assistance) 
had failed so miserably.   
     Another explanation given for the continuation of the developmental state in the 
modern day can also go along with some of the main points of this paper, which is that 
nuclear weapons have been cast away in northeast Asia largely because of the 
overwhelming drive toward greater wealth and international respect through the 
accumulation of capital.  Again of South Korea, Sook-Jong Lee and Taejoon Han 
write: “…Korea’s developmental state goes on (after the financial crisis) because its 
goal remains the same: economic growth.  And economic growth remains the single 
most important national objective because it is seen as a matter of survival, the best 
way to avoid all the crises it barely escaped time and again throughout its history (Lee 
et al. 2006: 323).”  In my opinion, that conclusion could be linked to the foregoing of 
nuclear weapons development for all three of the northeast Asian current democracies 
under examination in this paper.  Nuclear weapons are seen there as only exacerbating 
underlying antipathies that are not good for promoting continued prosperity, for any of 
the countries there.  North Korea, being something of the opposite of a developmental 
state, at least in terms of the results, again has broken the crucial rule through its 
nuclear weapons development. 
     Along with import tariffs that are often seen as some of the major ways that states 
can make clear their developmental state model preferences, the case of Taiwan shows 
how economic liberalization and governmental intervention are not exclusive.  
Christopher Dent writes: “Whilst Taiwan’s financial market regimes have gradually 
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opened up to foreign competition, so has the state’s capacity to counteract the risks of 
international market volatility that potentially stems from the same financial openness 
(Dent 2003: 480-81).”  Dent speaks of the institutionalization of the government in 
Taiwan determining the rules of the game within the domestic economy, ruling out 
some of the issues that can come through greater international cooperation. 
     Perhaps with regard to the NPT norm that had taken over, as mentioned by John 
Mueller, nuclear weapons may have ultimately been abandoned for Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, through the idolization of the successful Western economies.  
With nuclear weapons carrying with them the risk of stigmatizing a nation (the way 
that they have with the already ill-reputed North Korea), these countries could never 
ultimately justify possessing them.  With the dollars or treasury bonds in hand, these 
countries saw those as more linked to their security than weapons of mass destruction 
ever could, for as long as the current financial system was as durable as it still 
remains. 
    China presents a difficult case as far as this study is concerned with reconciling the 
developmental state idea with that of not proceeding forward with nuclear weapons 
development.  The nationalistic mobilization inherent to current Chinese economic 
strategy is very much like that of a developmental state model, and I would argue that 
it qualifies as such.  Still, China has nuclear weapons, while the other developmental 
states in the region of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan do not.  What is the 
explanation in terms of the developmental state?  In my opinion, the successful 1964 
Chinese nuclear test came at a time of overwhelming international threat to China, 
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both from the Western and Communist worlds, and it was also a time of cultural 
redefinition that had not been at all settled.  China’s current anti-nuclear weapons 
attitude that has become more apparent with its lack of approval for North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons would seem to speak more toward hypocrisy if not for China’s other 
harmonizing effects of late on the northeast Asian dynamic.  Recent Chinese foreign 
policies have been aggressive, but not militarily so.  Rather, the paradigm of the 
developmental state seems to be more suited to China in the present day because of its 
economic aggression as it becomes more a part of the international scene.  If China 
never had gone all the way and developed its own nuclear weapons, would it do so 
now if given the opportunity?  I would not be at all positive.  In fact, I rather doubt it.  
I believe that its rationalization for not doing so would be much the same as what has 
been spoken of about Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in this paper. 
     China’s current developmental state has certainly opened the door to a bolder 
version of the intermingling of the public and private sectors.  Not having as much of a 
democratic voice to answer to as in the other three countries mentioned, the Chinese 
Communist Party is perhaps freer than in the other cases to forge partnerships with the 
corporate world.  Perhaps because of that, China may now be the ultimate East Asian 
developmental state case.  China’s principles of wealth acquisition are now almost 
without parallel, far more advanced than any notions taking place during the time of 
Mao or the initial Chinese nuclear test. 
     The developmental state principle is not exactly an alternative to what I have been 
arguing in this paper for why northeast Asia has not experienced a nuclear arms race.  
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Rather, it is an addition, provided by many decades of scholarship from others, that 
accompanies, to a large extent, the economic side of my argument.  Chalmers Johnson 
writes: “…a strategy involving state guidance of the economy, cartelization, and the 
strategic allocation of industrial finance may so come to dominate a social system that 
development itself becomes the main legitimating and organizing principle of society, 
replacing or displacing democratic representation, tradition, or any other set of 
political or cultural principles (Johnson 2000: 145).”  Johnson’s definition of the 
developmental state mentioned there is a wonderful summation for all of the 
developed northeast Asian economies discussed in this paper.  Industrialization in 
terms of what could be globally respected became of such critical focus that it was 
lifted to practically the level of a mandatory state religion.  Spearheaded by the 
government, in each case, the population had to be rallied to help bring about a 
capitalistic victory.  In all three cases, and even in China, it ultimately worked to bring 
them into the industrial world.  Nuclear weapons development was never to be a 
welcome part of that.  The anti-nuclear weapons norm from the flipped Sagan 
argument is well represented with the developmental state model, as well. 
     Subduing the military, and by that token more militaristic impulses, the 
developmental state model indeed disrupted nuclear weapons development in the 
northeast Asian region, at least for the countries examined.  Solingen frames it well: 
“…the need for macroeconomic stability and reduced state entrepreneurship limited 
military complexes and undermined the military’s ability to develop independent 
resources, forcing it to evolve into more professional forces, less hostile to groups 
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underwriting outward-oriented growth (Solingen 2007: 771).”  The issue of what 
developmental states mean for democracy is another issue, but Solingen does not 
appear to find it altogether disturbing, either, given that the higher standards of living 
brought about by the developmental state model actually are succeeding in 
perpetuating democracy in these countries due to higher life satisfaction.  What can be 
said in the nuclear weapons context is that the developmental state created a need for 
such generous cooperation to and from the outside world that the development of 
nuclear weapons would have made the price too high to pay, even with the threats 
present that would be worrisome to national militaries.  Therefore, this stands as an 
addition to my overall economic argument. 
     Perhaps the most important thing to remember is that even though Northeast Asia 
had a lot of the proper elements in place in order to avoid a nuclear arms race, it still 
was a very close call, in some instances.  South Korea and Taiwan have had their 
relatively recent flirtations with nuclear weapons, in spite of fairly regular American 
oversight.  Cooler heads had to prevail in order to call the thing off.  Fortunately, a lot 
of the cooler heads were in China, perhaps the country in the region with the greatest 
ability to influence others, directly or indirectly, particularly with the decline of 
American power.  The fairly region-wide appreciation of increased wealth cannot be 
understated as a cause of not wanting to become a nuclear-weapons-coveting pariah of 
a nation, either.  The embarrassment of long-running and arduous warfare leading up 
to the end of the Vietnam War and the Sino-Vietnamese War seems to have shaken 
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Northeast Asia into a resilient mode of peacefulness and anti-nuclear-weapon 
sensibilities. 
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6. Conclusion 
     By walking through each case of the particular avoidance of nuclear weapons 
development in the three countries primarily put under the magnifying glass for this 
exploration, it is obvious that it has generally been a tenuous and perhaps unlikely path 
toward all three of them making the ultimate rejection, a rejection which, for the most 
part, seems resilient and unlikely to be undone anytime soon.  The American pressure 
inherent to each of these three countries since the beginning of the Cold War and 
following can be applied to Sagan’s security model, which serves very well as an 
explanation of the lack of development of nuclear weapons because of both that 
pressure and the American protection.  Because of the financial gains to be made from 
the perpetuation of those security relationships (up until fairly recently, even for 
Taiwan), the United States was also acting mostly out of self-interest, again related to 
the realist explanation for the security model that Sagan at least half-heartedly appears 
to disdain or finds “inadequate.”  The American protection granted to these three 
countries enabled them to fortunately and ultimately find alternatives to developing 
their own nuclear weapons, even though some scientists and policymakers continued 
to believe otherwise, which is why some nuclear bomb programs got further along 
than was probably justified by the diplomatic and tactical evidence. 
     The dominance of a financial investment regime and understanding among the 
three natural resource-poor countries under study here I believe may be the most 
convincing reason of all why none of them ended up going nuclear.  Given what the 
violation of the NPT would mean to the three countries in terms of disrupting the flow 
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of various kinds of capital into and out of their borders is unacceptable in each country 
examined.  North Korea, being so damaged by decades of all kinds of 
mismanagement, is exempt from that particular conclusion of mine.  They are too far 
gone.  Domestic politics that rely on support from many sectors, not least of which is 
the financial industry, that would be decimated by disruptions to the export model that 
all three countries have adopted to bring about their economic success have kept the 
nuclear computation in check for the foreseeable future.  The Indian model that Sagan 
presents in his discussion of the domestic aspects of nuclear weaponization serves as a 
perfect contrast to the interpretation of the nuclear potential of Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan.  For the most part, with the exception of the political far right in each 
country, the public in each country could be relied upon to react to their government’s 
successful nuclear test with at least sadness, but more likely rage.  Thanks to their 
democratic systems, the incumbent party would probably get taken apart in the next 
election cycle. 
     The norms model presented by Sagan is worthy of much citation in this paper and 
for these countries because the ideology of nuclear weapons bringing about some 
degree of global prestige has been rejected in northeast Asia.  Sagan indeed makes the 
norms model more agile by mentioning at the end of the article that “norms are sticky: 
individual and group beliefs about appropriate behavior change slowly, and over time 
norms can become rules embedded in political institutions.  In the short run, therefore, 
norms can be a brake on nuclear chain reactions: in contrast to more pessimistic realist 
predictions that ‘proliferation begets proliferation,’ the norms model suggests that 
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such nuclear reactions to emerging security threats can be avoided or at least delayed 
because of normative constraints (1996-97: 84).”  Northeast Asian nuclear weapons 
development is certainly constrained by a variety of norms that I have named, and 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have already taken remarkable risks in the extent to 
which they have previously ignored those norms already.  North Korea is on the fringe 
continually because of its snubbing of these northeast Asian norms.  China, as a 
staunch adherent to the northeast Asian peace norm of late, has helped to facilitate 
good behavior in northeast Asia in spite of its nuclear weapons possession, which the 
norm of the NPT has helped to perpetuate and make accepted.  The norm of material 
acquisition has been more thoroughly encouraged in the region.  Though China’s 
insistence on respecting the sovereignty of other countries has the capacity to frustrate 
countries such as the United States that want to take a harder line toward a country 
like North Korea, it has served the region well for the most part because peace is so 
much a part of what the Chinese government has championed.  If the Chinese 
government were to abandon this posture, all of this will of course be threatened.  By 
continually discouraging North Korea’s further nuclear weapons development, China 
has helped to send a message to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that it does not 
condone such behavior even from its allies, so a reprisal may be in order if any of 
them were to be politically diverted from their present courses.  The three democracies 
examined have also served to perpetuate the anti-nuclear norm to one another by 
(often at the very last minute) holding off on creating their own nuclear weapons.  
Another kind of domino effect might be observed if any one of them breaks from this 
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norm, but it is doubtful that any of the three would want to be historically remembered 
as the party that violated these regional principles. 
     I advocate the demand-side of the nuclear proliferation argument.  The supply per 
se in each of these countries has been sufficient to build the weapons, as far as the 
expertise present and these countries’ obvious ability to procure various materials 
from otherwise unlikely sources.  Their natural resource poorness has only served to 
activate other areas of their populations that are highly motivated to work collectively 
toward the ultimate perceived success of their nations.  Fortunately for the safety of 
the entire world, each of the three countries has ultimately arrived at the conclusion 
that the simply cannot build or possess their own nuclear weapons.  The demand, 
therefore, has dropped to almost nil.  These developments are similar to the decisions 
made by Ukraine, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, which are mentioned by Sagan 
in his mid-1990s article as having foregone the duty and pleasure of building nuclear 
weapons after the ascendance of more democratic forces in those countries persuaded 
the populace and policymakers in the other direction, wisely.  Those cases are not 
entirely dissimilar from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, where ever-more 
democratizing forces have also collaborated to take nuclear weapons development out 
of consideration. 
     The historical background of each of the three countries primarily studied for this 
paper has served to show how certain understandings, spoken or unspoken, have been 
reached in northeast Asia to maintain the peace and keep nuclear weapons off the table 
for the countries that want to be deemed responsible and worthy of global respect.  
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Oftentimes, it was a very close call, but it has been achieved.  The relatively recent 
theories on nuclear proliferation provide us with a framework for understanding the 
likelihood of nuclear weapons development circumstances, though, as has been 
pointed out (by Sagan, amongst the others that were often the first to discuss certain 
policies in a more modern context), this paper will hopefully be useful for 
understanding how imprinted northeast Asian countries have become in their anti-
nuclear weapon sentiments.  An outlier like North Korea can serve to show how 
diplomatic and military foul-ups can cause painful realities down the line.  By 
applying Sagan’s nuclear weapons development models to some of my own 
conclusions related to why northeast Asia has not had a significant nuclear arms race, 
we can gain a better understanding of how a region can drift into its own particular 
framework of principles and policies.  Thanks to its own versions of those principles 
and policies, northeast Asia has become safer than it would be otherwise from the 
dangers of nuclear weapons.    
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